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VIRTUAL REALITY AND REALITY: 
THE EAST ASIAN NICS AND THE 
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 
ERNESTO M. HIZON* 
When I tell any truth, it is not for the sake of 
convincing those who do not know it, 
but for the sake of defending those that do. 
William Blake 
It is difficult to get a man to understand 
something when his salary depends upon 
his not understanding it. 
Upton Sinclair 
History has always had the uncanny ability to reinvent itself. 
The notion of history as an objective reality _. a collection or 
thread of concrete facts and occurrences - is a dangerously 
naive concept that lends itself to a counterfeit perspective of 
reality. The history of a movement, or an idea, or a paradigm, 
its progression, its development into norms of behavior, are 
created by those who describe it, fashion its rules, define its 
ethics. In sum, historical interpretations and their significance 
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are formulated by those who write them, constructing a virtual 
reality from a set of facts. 
The history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and its evolution into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) is a case in point. The outcome of the Uruguay Round 
has been hailed as "a milestone for developing countries,"! 
producing the "most fundamental reform of the world trading 
system since the establishment of the [GATT] in 1947.')'2 It 
must be borne in mind that although world trade has increased 
with the GATT system in place for four decades, income 
inequalities have remained, if not actually increased. 
A World Bank publication has reported that, although world 
exports grew at the compound annual rate of 12.7% from 1965 
to 1990, the geographic pattern of trade has hardly changed 
over the last quarter century. Developing countries as a group 
accounted for 27% of world exports in both 1965 and 1988. 
While the export share of several East and Southeast Asian 
countries rose markedly within the non-oil exporting group of 
developing countries, the export share of African and Western 
Hemisphere developing countries declined significantly. By 
1990 South Korea alone was exporting more than all of Africa. 
Similarly, the share of industrial countries export remained 
unchanged at about 73%, until the late 1990s.3 In practical 
terms, this means that while the East Asian economies 
progressed rapidly in the last twenty-five years, they merely 
acquired a greater percentage of the developing country share 
of the international trade pie. The industrial nations, which 
comprise a smaller share of the world population,' maintained 
their larger slice of the pie, as expected. 
In contrast, the World Bank estimates that the Uruguay Round 
is likely to generate as much as $200 billion a year in global 
income, in absolute dollar terms, with somewhere between one 
1. MICHAEL BRUNO, Foreword, in WILL MARTIN & L. ALAN WINTERS, THE 
URUGUAY ROUND: WIDENING AND DEEPENING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1995). 
20 [do at 1. 
30 I.MoDo LITTLE ET ALo, BOOM, CRISIS AND ADJuSTMENT: THE MACROECONOMIC 
EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12, 13 (1993)0 
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quarter to one half going to developing countries, particularly 
to those which have relatively reduced their own protection.4 
The same paper by the World Bank opines that the largest 
gains from the Round will accrue to the East Asian WTO 
members, pursuant to the liberalization commitments in 
agriculture and manufactures, and the abolition of the Multi-
Fiber Arrangement.5 
In an Overview Paper prepared· by the World Trade 
Organization, Asian developing nations, as a group, have out-
performed all the other developing countries by a wide margin 
in terms of their share in world trade, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector, which doubled by ten to twenty percent 
since 1980. The same study also notes, in regard to developing 
countries, a high correlation between their export performance 
and the share of manufactured goods in their exports, as well 
as a positive correlation between exports and the share of 
investments in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and of 
manufactures in GDP.6 Proving this point, while manufactures 
account for more than eighty percent of total merchandise 
exports for the East Asian developing countries (including 
China), the corresponding share for other developing countries 
is less than half the figure.7 Between 1990 to 1996 alone, seven 
of the ten fastest growing merchandise traders in the world 
were East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs),8 
4. Bruno, supra note 1, at 4, 5. 
5. BRUNO, supra note 1, at 7. 
6. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN 
WORLD TRADE, OVERVIEW OF MAJOR TRENDS AND UNDERLYING FACTORS, 
WT/COMTDIWI15, at 1- 2 (Note by the Secretariat, August 16, 1996). 
7. BRUNO, supra note 1, at 7. 
8. The terms "East Asian NICs" (i.e. newly industrializing economies) and "NIEs" 
(i.e. newly industrializing economies) have become part of the standard terminology of 
economists, political scientists and legal experts to describe a group of rapidly growing 
East Asian countries that roughly adhere to the so-called "East Asian economic 
development model." Neither the GATT nor the Uruguay Round agreements define 
what an NIC or NIE is. Suffice it to say that there is agreement that the NICs are a 
group of countries in East Asia which, in terms of world economic development, are in a 
transitional stage between the LDCs (Le. less developed countries) of the Third World, 
and the AlCs (Le. advanced industrialized countries) of the West. They are also called 
semi-industrial countries, middle-income major exporters, and emerging or transitional 
economies. 
The East Asian NICs are considered "new" simply because they have followed the 
footsteps of Japan, which is the original postwar "newly industrializing" country. 
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They are to be distinguished from the "old" countries such as the United States, and 
the countries of Western Europe, which are the "old" or traditional First World 
industrial countries. 
The four original NICs -- Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore -- have 
also been nicknamed the "gang of four," or the "four little tigers." Depending on the 
economic or developmental standards applied, other East Asian countries constitute a 
second-tier of NICs -- which may include Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and to a lesser 
extent, the Philippines. They are to be differentiated from the lower income developed 
countries who have acquired a new category, the LLDCs (i.e. the less developed 
countries). 
There are basically two ways the NICs can be viewed from a political economy 
standpoint: the comparative-static view or the dynamic-global definition. Under the 
static view, the emergence of the NICs is an event that occurs in historical time and 
demarcates the phenomenon of industrialization occurring after the Second World War. 
See generally ANIs CHOWDHURY & IYANATUL ISLAM, THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING 
ECONOMIES OF EAST AsIA (1993). The other, more dynamic view treats the emergence 
of the NIC as a change in the world production structure that corresponds to shifts in 
the international division of labor. One expert writes, "These changes occur as a result 
of a generalized historical movement in which industrialized countries vacate 
intermediate sectors in industrial production in which advanced developing countries 
are currently more competitive and advanced developing countries, in turn, vacate 
more basic industrial sectors in which the next tier of developing countries have a 
relative advantage." C.1. BRADFORD, JR., The Rise of the NICS as Exporters on a Global 
Scale, in THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES: TRADE AND ADJuSTMENT (L. Turner 
& N. McMullen eds., 1982). It is this more global definition that is implicitly used in 
this article. For further elaboration of this theme from the political economy point of 
view, see the other books by the same author: C. I. Bradford, Jr., NICs and the Next-
Tier NICS as Transitional Economies, in TRADE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE 
PACIFIC AREA (C. Bradford, Jr. & W. Branson eds., 1987); C. I. Bradford, Jr., Trade and 
Structural Change: NICs and the Next-tier NICs as Transitional Economies, 15:3 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 299. 
Bela Balassa, in a pioneering World Bank study, defmed a roughly quantitative 
view of the NIC: he classifies an NIC as one of the developing countries that had a per 
capita income in excess of$I,100 in 1978 and whose share of the manufacturing sector 
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was about twenty percent or higher in 1977. BELA 
BALASSA, The Newly Industrializing Countries after the Oil Crisis, WORLD BANK STAFF 
WORKING PAPERS, No. 47/1980. This concept was later developed in B. BAlASSA, THE 
NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1981). 
The Organization for Economic Development (OECD) in 1979 adopted five criteria 
for defining an "NIE": 
1. Fast growth since the 1960s; 
2. High industrialization, with industrialization accounting for 
a large proportion of GDP; 
3. Fast growth in both the absolute level of industrial 
employment and the share of industrial employment to total 
employment; 
4. A high export orientation, with a rising share of world 
exports of manufactures; 
5. Fast growth in real per capita GDP such that the country 
was successful in narrowing the gap with the advanced industrialized 
countries. 
See OECD, THE IMPACT OF THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES ON 
PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN MANUFACTURES (1979). 
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including Malaysia, the Philippines, China,9 Thailand, 
Singapore, South Korea and Indonesia.lO Among the top 
twenty exporters in the world, seven are East Asian, including 
Japan, Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Malaysia. Thailand and Indonesia are also included in the 
top thirty. It is important to note, in terms of world share of 
manufactures in 1996, that Hong Kong has a higher share than 
Belgium, and that South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan have 
higher aggregate shares than Spain, Mexico, Switzerland, 
Australia, Austria and even the Russian Federation. In the 
lower tier of NICs, Thailand beats Ireland, and Indonesia 
surpasses Norway, Denmark and Finland in terms of ranking 
in world merchandise trade.ll 
Before the East Asian downturn in July of 1997, the global 
economy was expanding at an accelerated rate, and the 
problem that many foresaw was one of too much growth. But 
the latest East Asian economic crisis, which many were quick 
to construe as a repudiation of the East Asian economic model, 
makes a reappraisal of the evolution of the global trade order 
and the present global trade order even more timely. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BASIC THESES 
Since its inception, the GATTIWT012 "system" has produced a 
gargantuan corpus of principles that have already crystallized 
A simpler definition of an NIC is a country that has manufacturing sectors of a 
similar relative size to those of industrialized countries. SHEILA PAGE, TRADE FINANCE 
AND DEVEWPING COUNTRIES 4 (1990). 
9. China is not technically an NIC in the strict sense because of its 
predominantly socialist economy and much larger size, in comparison to the other 
NICs. 
10. World Merchandise Trade in 1996 by Region and by Leading Trader, WTO 
International Trade <http://www.wto.org/wto/intltrad/iiworld.htm>. 
11. [d. at Appendix l. 
12. The basic legal texts for what can be collectively called the GATTIWTO system 
can be found in the official publication of THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1994). 
This compendium includes, among others, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Multilateral Agreements on 
Trade in Goods, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, and the General Agreement on 
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into some kind of "objective" doctrine, taking on a life of its 
own. Reverence for . this mainstream thinking has eclipsed 
many of the significant subtexts hidden in its historical 
background, the broad repercussions of the 1994 Marrakesh 
accord, and the far-reaching linkages proposed for the near 
future between trade and non-trade related issues. 
Encouraged in the ongoing analysis is a somewhat dogmatic 
attitude toward its rules. Anything that deviates from this 
particular installed set of principles is labeled either 
economically inefficient, extremist or protectionist. 
That melting pot of economically successful Asian NIC nations 
is a cauldron in which the liberalizing thrust of international 
trade (as defmed by the GATTIWTO "system"), together with 
the phenomenal economic growth of this group of Asian 
countries according to their own characteristic approach to 
economic development, have formed a volatile mixture. 
No doubt, the phenomenon called the "East Asian Miracle" has 
benefited from the increased access in a liberalized trading 
order. However, the commonly-held view that these countries 
achieved their economic advance in large part by violating the 
sacred canons of the GATT world order, and that they exploited 
to the hilt the preferential treatment and exceptions accorded 
to developing countries, is a totally disingenuous and 
unrealistic notion. No member state of the GATT can be said 
to be guiltless of skirting its restrictions when it suited their 
economic needs. The double standard is the only balanced 
standard in the interpretation of its historical context and 
continuing development. 
Admittedly, there can be no single perspective on the 
development of the world trading system. The lopsided global 
economic and political reality, however, has steered the 
Tariffs and Trade of 1947. The aforementioned agreements are covered by this article, 
while the following are excluded from its scope: the plurilateral trade agreements (Le. 
those on trade in civil aircraft, government procurement, dairy and bovine meat 
products); the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures; the agreement on 
subsidies; issues relating to trade and environment; financial services as a specific 
sector; maritime transport services; basic telecommunications; professional services; 
and the Multi-Fiber Agreement. 
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GATTIWTO framework in a certain direction, and has 
consistently favored a perspective that fails to appreciate the 
developing countries' experience with the system. With the 
rise of the East Asian NICs, and paradoxically, with their 
downfall, a clarification, or perhaps even a refutation of certain 
accepted doctrines is in order. Five arguments are set forth in 
this article, with many variations upon the themes elaborated 
from various angles throughout, as the particulars of the WTO 
agreements are discussed. 
First, neither the GATT nor the WTO framework qualifies as a 
true "system" in the sense of being a consistent, coordinated 
and organized structure, whether formal or otherwise, that 
aims to regulate international trade. Due to numerous 
derogations and exceptions to the fundamental principles it 
espouses, whether within the WTO architecture or outside it, 
the underlying driving force is still reciprocity and overriding 
national or regional interests. The quid pro quo character of 
the GATT is not completely altered by the more prominent 
rule-based nature of the new WTO set of agreements. Recent 
decisions of the Appellate Body, and the ever-increasing 
number of panel reports, indicate that there is indeed a trend 
toward the "rule of law" in trade disputes. However, the WTO 
has yet to face the acid test of whether the developed countries, 
once their fundamental trade interests are threatened, would 
be willing to bow to the wishes of the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB). 
Second, the asymmetry in the economic and political 
relationships between the developed and developing countries, 
and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) which occupy 
the middle ground between these two poles, has caused the 
continuous rewriting and expansion of the international trade 
rules according to the dynamic factors that affect the process of 
globalization. This scenario is not helped any by the perpetual 
question never satisfactorily answered: What is a Newly 
Industrializing Country (NIC)? Does the onset of the East 
Asian crisis neutralize any claim to being an NIC? In the real 
world, the erstwhile dichotomy between a developed country 
and a developing economy has become blurred; what has 
evolved is a dynamic interaction between a relatively more 
7
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developed country and a relatively less developed one. The East 
Asian NICs have enjoyed the fruits of a globalized economy, at 
least before the regional crisis, but this system has 
marginalized other parts of the world, such as Africa and parts 
of the Middle East. If globalization, using the paradigm of free 
trade as the ideal, truly trickles down to even the poorest 
states, then marginalization as it occurs today should not be 
the case. 
The endemic reVISIOn of the rules is largely based on the 
changing competitive relationships between the entrenched 
developed countries and the NIC "pretenders" to the economic 
throne. With the bursting of the East Asian "bubble", the 
future of the continued realignment of the rules to include, 
among others, the expanded scope of the WTO rules on services 
and the expiration of the grace period for developing countries 
in the realm of intellectual property, may largely depend on 
current economic needs, and paradoxically, a quid pro quo, ad 
hoc approach to the WTO system. 
Third, the peculiar impact of the East Asian "miracle" can be 
considered as a major, if not the main impetus for the GATT's 
gradually shifting orientation, from the reduction of tariffs and 
goods, to an emphasis on services, intellectual property, 
investments, environment and other non-trade related issues 
such as labor standards, competition, social dumping and 
corruption. The NICs were compelled to conform to this 
mercantilistic drift because of the need to check the use of 
protectionist measures exercised formally and informally 
within and without the GATT framework. However, this 
orientation consigns the _ NICs, as well as the rest of the 
developing world, to play an eternal game of "catch-up". 
Without the Asian model in "catch-up" mode, the East Asian 
region would have remained at the periphery of the then GATT 
system. The NICs' emulation of Japan's success has spurred a 
growth industry in the arsenal of trade protection instruments, 
many of which remain in place, notwithstanding their 
fundamental incompatibility with the spirit of the Uruguay 
Round agreements. Thus, developing countries in East Asia 
and Latin America (notably Brazil and Mexico) have resorted 
to antidumping measures, which if examined closely, run 
8
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contrary to the spirit of the free trade philosophy of the WTO. 
Paradoxically, many of these measures, copied from their 
Western legislative models, have targeted other developing 
countries. 
Fourth, despite the major improvements in the WTO 
Agreements (especially in the area of dispute settlement), the 
WTO body of rules remain a "patchwork quilt" of compatible 
and incompatible obligations and arrangements, the 
inconsistencies reflecting the changeable and perhaps still 
tentative nature of the agreement. What the Round 
accomplished was the extension of the GATT disciplines to 
agriculture, services, investment measures and intellectual 
property, in some areas, but only to a limited extent. Although 
the developments in these areas are more in the nature of 
framework agreements than immediate reductions in 
protection, the WTO tabula makes accessible a beachhead for 
further concessions in these areas from the NICs. The 
Uruguay Round Agreements also offer a prelude to more far-
reaching proposals from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, such as non-
trade related linkages involving labor standards, human rights, 
and children's rights. Such proposals. reflect the OECD 
countries' continuing discomfort and defensiveness in the face 
of the dogged persistence of the East Asian, and to a lesser 
extent, Latin American NICs. 
Fifth, if there was the myth of the East Asian miracle, the new 
myth is that of the East Asian debacle. Many critics of East 
Asia forget that the region experienced fifteen years of high 
growth - i.e. 8-10% per annum - largely· fuelled by the 
confidence and investment of foreign investors. It was only in 
the mid-1990s, in a burst of over-expansion, that excessive 
borrowings occurred. Like it or not, the economic center of 
gravity has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific, 
notwithstanding Asian regional crisis and the birth of the Euro 
in 1999. East Asia's sheer size alone guarantees its eventual 
recovery. 
In a sense, the East Asian economies were victims of their own 
success. The East Asian economic crisis does not diminish the 
9
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uniqueness and efficacy of the Asian model in international 
commerce. The admirable values of the Chinese guanxi system 
of business by family and personal relations, the consensual 
leadership of the Malay mushawarah, the emphasis on the 
extended family, education and the work ethic, were debased 
by cronyism and corruption, the lack of checks and balances in 
business dealings, and the abuses of public office by 
government officials. In the absence of the so-called "Asian 
values", the region would not have had the potential for high 
growth. Asian values still exist and can thrive in the context of 
the adjustments that have to be made as the region adjusts to 
the stricter requirements of the global economy. Indeed, it will 
be these values that help the countries to recover. The region 
never spurned the concept of the "rule-of-Iaw" in the economic 
order, which not infrequently was advanced by the naysayers 
of the regional economic miracle. The institution of a level 
playing field, and its integration in the economic, political and 
social structure of the Asian NICs, requires time. It took the 
West nearly two centuries to perfect its system that started 
with the nineteenth century industrial revolution. Thus, it 
would be unfair to judge the Asian Pacific region's performance 
within a much more limited time frame. 
This article proceeds from a particular vantagepoint, observing 
the GATTIWTO system from the outside looking in, rather 
than viewing its development purely from within. Many ideas 
advanced here deviate from much of mainstream thinking. But 
this "heretical" approach is imperative, if only to satisfy the 
need to establish a different perspective. 
In this study, the GATTIWTO "system" will first be 
distinguished from the actual global trade regime as it 
developed in the context of the emerging East Asian economies. 
Next will follow a brief narrative history of the rise of the East. 
Asian NICs from a less than idealistic perspective. With the 
historical context in place, the article then delves into the 
concept of "fairness" and the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, placing the rules embodied in the procedure in 
situational context vis-a-vis developing countries. The 
changing center of gravity within the system is then illustrated 
by discussion of the WTO's shift in policy towards intellectual 
10
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property and services. Finally, the article concludes with an 
analysis of the recent East Asian economic crisis and its effect 
on the global trading order. 
II. THE GATTfWTO AND THE GLOBAL TRADE REGIME13 
A distinction should be drawn betweeri the GATTfWTO 
"system" as it purports to be, and the actual global trade 
regime that determines the conduct of international trade 
relations between nations. The original conception of the 
GATT was that all the contractual parties would conform to the 
broad, non-discriminatory principles of Most Favored ~ation 
(MFN) status and national treatment, as stated in Articles I 
and III, respectively. The aim was to liberalize trade by 
preventing discrimination between locally produced and 
imported goods at national borders, as well as by seeking to 
prevent discrimination against goods outside national borders. 
At the same time, in a trade environment where tariffs were 
high, the GATT embarked on its noble goal of reducing tariffs 
by bindings agreed upon by the parties in a series of 
negotiating rounds. To sum up, trade rules were agreed upon 
multilaterally, theoretically amongst equal sovereigns. 
The GATT was one of the postwar multilateral agreements 
created to avoid the perilous exercise of mercantilism and 
economic nationalism that lay at the roots of the conflict which 
led to the world wars. The GATT was conceived as merely a 
provisional understanding, when the Havana Charter of 1947, 
which sought to erect a formal institutional structure - the 
International Trade Organization (ITO) - to regulate the use 
of trade-restricting measures in international commerce, failed 
to be ratified. Hence the GATT, initially just a preliminary 
step towards a more encompassing structure to regulate the 
13. The views expressed in this section may not conform to the mainstream view. 
As far as the established orthodoxy is concerned, the main source is JOHN H. JACKSON, 
ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS 
AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995). As for the European views, a recent work is 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw AND THE GATTIWTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
(Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1996). 
11
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conduct of trade, became the core of the "value system" 
envisioned to liberalize trade access. 
Distilled into its conceptual essence, the GATTIWTO "system" 
rests on two basic precepts: first, it is a rule-based system; and 
second, under the MFN principle, all nations are to be treated 
equally. As to the first postulate, various questions arise: Who 
writes the rules? What particular aspects of international 
trade do they cover? Do they favor one type or class of nations 
over another? Do the rules allow nations to be treated equally 
in the real or common sense, or are they merely treated equally 
under the rules, as established? As to the second premise, 
MFN can only achieve its objective, on the theoretical plane, if 
all nations are on equal footing. Otherwise, the poorer nations 
suffer due to equal treatment. Formally equal nations cannot 
in fact perform or respond equally under the same set of 
circumstances, since an open market system invariably enables 
the stronger to prevail. As a consequence, the hypothetically 
(or formalistically) rule-based system endures as a power-based 
arrangement, in which the asymmetries in the relative 
economic or political power of the actors determine the 
complexion of their trade relationship. 
This critique is not meant to disparage the virtue inherent in 
the avowed objectives of the GATT and WTO. Without this 
fundamental framework, the postwar momentum in economic 
growth, especially for the Asian NICs, would not have occurred. 
However, the naturally deleterious effects of MFN on the less 
prosperous countries should at least be acknowledged. It must 
be conceded that, under such circumstances, there never has 
been, since the beginning of "GATT time" in 1947, nor can 
there ever be, a "level playing field" in the international trade 
environment. The "level playing field" paradigm, upon which 
the MFN tenet is built, refers to an optim~ situation where 
market forces objectively determine both resource allocation 
and the distribution of rewards according to productivity. 
However, this emphasis on distribution and productivity 
12
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disregards the initial inequalities, and effectively rewards the 
stronger. 14 
This particular dimension should not be neglected or glossed 
over by policy-makers and commentators. It is often argued 
that contingent protection measures, "gray area" policies, and 
unilateral defensive practices against "unfair trade" have been 
instituted to level the playing field in the exchange of goods. 
Such an argument is founded upon an illusion, since there can 
never be a level playing field in international trade. It is 
actually a hypocritical assertion, because those developed 
nations who claim it refuse to accept that the imposition of an 
MFN regime on flagrantly mismatched participants imposes 
disadvantageous conditions on the weak. Lurking ominously 
throughout is the danger that the desirable ''balancing of 
interests" in such a system would be destabilized by the 
imbalance of economic power resulting from the skewed 
coverage of the rules. In this type of free trade context, the 
weaker nations tend to suffer most of the time, despite 
procedural and institutional safeguards aimed at protecting 
them. 
This discussion is rendered academic when one weighs the 
nullifying effects of the numerous derogations to the basic 
GATT principles. These exceptions have been formalized 
through various informal arrangements, formal conventions 
and bilateral agreements - all of which violate the letter and 
spirit of the principles of non-discrimination, multilateralism 
and transparency that the entire GATT scheme advocates. The 
much-maligned General System of Preferences (GSP), 
instituted for the benefit of developing countries, was no match 
. for these exceptions - the special agreements in textiles (the 
Multi-Fiber Agreement), agriculture (variable levy in the then 
European Community), and manufactures (Voluntary Export 
Restraints in footwear, electronics, automobiles, steel, 
computer chips) - which were artfully targeted at commodities 
exported by developing countries, and later, manufactures 
produced by the NICs. These exclusions and deviations from 
14. DZAY MEHMET, WESTERNIZING THE THIRD WORLD 137 (1995). 
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the general framework punctured the already fragile legal 
framework sought to be created, since they pertain to specific 
sectors that would allow the poorer countries a fighting chance 
in the world market. 
In the late 1980s, the emergence of unilateral trade measures 
primarily affecting Japan and the East Asian NICs15 -
exemplified by the super 301 and special 301 provisions of the 
Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 from the United States, and by 
overzealous contingency protection such as slanted anti-
dumping and countervailing duty determinations from the 
European Community - made it distressingly clear that the 
global trade regime really pursued a different set of rules from 
those the GATT order exemplified. Not only are such measures 
derogations of GATT precepts, but they contravene the very 
structure of the liberal trading system. The following 
statement, written by a prominent international trade legal 
scholar, would be valid if and only if the GATT were 
synonymous with the global trade regime that actually controls 
international commerce. Such is not the case. Note the 
idealized notion of GATT as a code of legal obligations: 
Finally, GATT law itself should probably be counted as a 
source of support for the interest of developing countries. After 
almost forty years, the GATT's code of legal obligations has 
begun to acquire the respect of a legal system built on right -
on norms that command respect, not merely because they have 
been paid for but also because they define correct and 
responsible government behaviour. Time has also endowed 
GATT obligations with a quality of law in the institutional 
sense, so that GATT obligations now possess a certain amount 
of respect-for-Iaw force independent of their substance. This 
larger perception of GATT law can already be seen in the 
handling of legal complaints brought by developing countries. 
15. See Ernesto M. Hizon, Antidumping and the European Policy vis-a.-vis the East 
Asian Newly Industrializing Countries, 18 J. WORLD COMPETITION 111 (1994). 
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GATT law may be of only limited force, but it does seem to 
cover the non-paying member. IS 
It has also been suggested that regional trading arrangements, 
despite their growing prominence in all of the world's regions, 
likewise constitute derogations of GATT principles, and are 
merely tolerated because they are a fact of life. To date, 
neither the GATT nor WTO Secretariat has made any 
categorical pronouncements as to whether these regional 
arrangements - the most celebrated of which is the European 
Union - are consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT 
Agreement. The spreading inconsistency of the world trading 
system has been described as an "erosion" of GATT principles.l7 
Whether erosion in the system has benefited or harmed global 
trade is not at issue here. A closer look at the proximate 
causes for this erosion should be taken, an examination of why 
measures were favored that departed from the GATT canons. 
Certainly much of the ''backsliding'' from the ideal multilateral 
system could be attributed to unforeseen economic 
developments such as the oil shock of the seventies, the 
recession of the eighties, and the East Asian economic crisis of 
the nineties. As discussed below, it was the unanticipated, 
rapid ascension, first of Japan, then of the East Asian NICs, 
and subsequently of the second-tier NICs led by the ASEAN 
countries, that provoked the gradual undermining of the 
GATT. 
16. ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GAT!' LEGAL SYSTEM 190 
(Trade Policy Research Centre 1987) (emphasis added). 
17. John Whalley and Colleen Hamilton have described the global trading system 
as having evolved into a "system architecture" with four distinct subsystems. JOHN 
WHALLEY & COLLEEN HAMILTON, THE TRADING SYSTEM AFTER THE URUGUAY RoUND 
23 (Institute for International Economics, 1996). This critique was earlier developed in 
JOHN WHALLEY, The Uruguay Round and the GATT: Whither the Global System, in C. 
FRED BERGSTEN & MARCUS NOLAND, PACIFIC DYNAMISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM 65 (Institute for International Economics 1993). See also H.B. 
MALMGREN, Threats to the Multilateral System, in W.R. CLINE, TRADE POLICY IN THE 
1980s (Institute for International Economics 1983); M. CAMPS & W. DIEBOLD, JR., THE 
NEW MULTILATERALISM (Council on Foreign Relations 1986); J.H. JACKSON, 
REsTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM, (Pinter for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1990). 
15
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It cannot be overemphasized that the whole philosophy of 
multilateralism and its institutionalization was initiated, 
encouraged and more than occasionally, gently forced on the 
others by the Western developed countries, mainly by the 
United States and Europe. Yet, under assault by more 
competitive products from the Far East, the very entities that 
pushed the GATT agenda were ready to act in their own self-
interest by implementing trade policies contrary to GATT 
principles. Authors have attributed this fall to the decline of 
American economic and political hegemony, which dominance 
had contributed to the stability and steady direction of the 
global trading system in its first quarter of the twentieth 
century. is The attention of U.S. decision-makers shifted from 
the maintenance of a liberal international economic order to 
the assertion of its commercial interests vis-a-vis its trade 
partners. 19 With the weakening of US economic power in the 
global economy, the liberal economic system, despite the 
"progression" of the WTO, is always in jeopardy . 
. The erstwhile lower income (NIC) countries, which managed to 
progress within the constraints of the lopsided economic 
relationships in the postwar era, have always been the 
scapegoats for the deterioration of the GATT system. While it 
is true that many NICs were guilty of infringing the GATT 
rules, mostly out of the need to hurdle their economically 
disadvantaged positions, the contingency protection schemes, 
farm subsidies, Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), and 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) instituted by much of the 
developed world, constituted even larger scale aberrations from 
the GATT framework. 
The anti-dumping measures in Article VJ20 of the GATT, 
carried over to the Uruguay Round agreements, were 
18. See R.O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE 
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Jagdish Bhagwati, The Diminished Giant 
Syndrome, 72 FOR. AFF. 2, 22-26 (1993). 
19. GAVIN BOYD, STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 51 
(1991). 
20. The primary difference between the GATT Article VIfl'okyo Round Code rules 
on anti-dumping and the Uruguay Round provisions on anti-dumping is the presence of 
additional procedural requirements to ensure, in theory, that anti-dumping is not 
16
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sophisticated trade protection measures employed by developed 
countries against the export manufactures of the developing 
countries, particularly the East Asian NICs. Hugo Paemen, 
the European Union's chief negotiator in the Uruguay Round, 
declared that dumping "is unfair by nature." He continued, "if 
a period of selling at a loss forms part of an export strategy 
aimed at wiping out the competition in the target market, 
GATT quite reasonably and quite properly allows 
countermeasures.'>2l 
However, an NIC export strategy coupled with government 
policies that aimed to increase their countries' share of 
manufactures to their overall GDP could not materialize if 
their economies depended entirely on their small domestic 
markets. Thus, expanding the share of their foreign target 
markets was the main impetus to their accelerated growth. If 
no form of domestic market protection were implemented, then 
the NICs would have remained primary producers and would 
have severely limited their options to jumpstart their 
economies. EU and U.S. anti-dumping determinations against 
products from NICs reduced the export onslaught and allowed 
domestic producers to fend off foreign competition, or gave 
them time to regroup and improve the competitiveness of their 
products.22 
abused. See David Palmeter, A Commentary on the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, 30 J. 
WORLD TRADE L. 4, 43-69 (1996). See also Gary N. Horlick & Eleanor C. Shea, The 
World Trade Organization Antidumping Agreement, 29 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 5-31 
(1995). 
21. HuGO PAEMEN & ALEXANDRA BENSCH, FROM THE GATT TO THE WTO·· THE; 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE URUGUAY ROUND 158 (1995). 
22. There is a large body of writing on anti-dumping laws, although one's opinion 
of them depends on which side you are on. The most recent major texts are: ANTI-
DUMPING LAw AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (John H. Jackson & Edwin 
Vermulst eds., 1991); EDWIN VERMULST & PAUL WAER, EC ANTI-DUMPING LAw AND 
PRACTICE (1996). The basic, original work on dumping is JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A 
PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1991). Older general works that contain sections 
on dumping are: JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT (1969); 
KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
(1970); J.F. BESELER & AN. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW: THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1986); ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAw: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993). 
17
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In the rules embodied in the GATT 1947 and the Tokyo Round 
Code, the reality of dumping in was obfuscated by the mass of 
technicalities created by the implementation of anti-dumping 
by national jurisdictions, notably the European Community 
countries and the United States. The same holds true under 
the even more stringent and complex anti-dumping rules 
contained in the Uruguay Round agreements.23 Dumping, 
which is simplistically defined as selling goods in the foreign 
market at a price lower than at the price it is sold in the 
domestic market, does not require any determination that 
competition in the foreign market be "wiped out" and 
effectively impaired.24 All it requires is a finding of the 
lopsided price differential between the price sold in the local 
market and the export market.25 
23. Palmeter, supra note 20, at 68. 
24. There is a growing movement on the part of trade economists and 
international trade lawyers to eliminate anti-dumping laws altogether and replace 
them with antitrust and competition laws. This theme has been written about in a 
number of papers, among them: Jorge Miranda, Should Antidumping Laws be 
Dumped?, 28 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 255; Patrick Messerlin, Should Anti·Dumping 
Rules Be Replaced by National or International Competition Rules?, 18 WORLD 
COMPETITION 37 (1994); Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dumping, 
Antidumping and Antitrust, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 27 (1996). 
25. An extended analysis of anti-dumping is pursued here. However, Article 17. of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the Uruguay Round agreements contains provisions 
on standards of review that may affect the conduct of anti-dumping cases filed with the 
WTO Dispute Settlement system, and ultimately, affect the products of the East Asian 
NICs -- against which a majority of these cases are filed. Since the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure is a global system, the disputes arising under the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement are to be resolved in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. Article 17:6(I) provides, with respect to the review of the 
facts regarding the dumping determination, that "[iln its assessment of the facts of the 
matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts 
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If 
the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and 
objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the 
evaluation shall not be overturned." 
In other words, the standard of review of the dumping determinations by national 
authorities shall be restricted only to whether they were "proper," "unbiased" and 
"objective." This narrow scope limits the power of the WTO dispute settlement panel, 
and possibly, the Appellate Body, as the case may be, to initiate a wholly new review of 
the facts. In essence, it is largely dependent on, and defers to a great extent to the 
determinations of the national authorities, who would certainly be inclined to make a 
determination of dumping, if their national interest so dictates. While this may codify 
existing GATT Panel practice, it consolidates the position of the countries wield the 
anti-dumping measures. Thus, although there are procedural safeguards that might 
protect the disadvantaged parties, notably the parties against which anti-dumping 
18
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No WTO member state can claim any measure of innocence, 
since they have always fallen back on pragmatic considerations 
when the virtues of multilateralism and nondiscrimination 
were absent in concrete situations. In pari delicto, so to speak. 
Deviations from GATT postulates should be deemed deviations, 
regardless of what they may be called. Perversity reaches its 
apex when it advocates of unilateral trade measures claim that 
Section 301 of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act actually liberalizes trade by helping open markets not only 
for the United States, but for the rest of the world as well?6 
In practice, the global trade regime is a "bi-polar" but 
synchronous system, in which there exists, on the one hand, a 
legalistic, formal structure of trade rules that flow from the 
evolved GATTIWTO tenets, and on the other hand, a neo-
mercantilist, non-formal trade policy architecture that is 
defmed by the asymmetric economic, historical, regional and 
political relationships between the member states. The 
seeming harmony of the international trade regime is a legal 
mirage perpetuated by the attractive unity of the GATTIWTO 
cases are filed, the limited standard of review diminishes their options once a contrary 
ruling has been issued. 
For a lengthy overview of the anti-dumping ''jurisprudence'' of the GATI'IWTO 
system, see Edwin Vermulst & Norio Komuro, Anti·Dumping Disputes in the 
GATTIWTO, Navigating Dire Straits, 31 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 5-33 (1997); Edwin 
Vermulst, Adopting and Implementing Anti·Dumping Laws, Some Suggestions for 
Developing Countries, 31 J. WORLD TRADE L. 2, 5-23 (1997). 
26. See, e.g., GREG MAsTEL, AMERICAN TRADE LAws AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 
(1996). Some of the arguments in this book can be aptly characterized as "cowboy 
trade diplomacy" that gives carte blanche to the U.S. Government to decide whether a 
trade practice is fair or unfair, to be punished through multilateral or unilateral 
means. To illustrate with an excerpt: 
There will still be cases that cannot be pursued through 
multilateral institutions, either because the target country involved is 
not a party to the new WTO or because the issue to be addressed is 
not covered by the WTO. A number of major trading countries remain 
outside the WTO and are likely to remain so for some time. Trade 
problems that are increasingly recognized as serious commercial 
problems, including private-sector collusion and forced technology 
transfer, are also beyond the scope of the WTO. In these cases, the 
United States will be faced with a simple choice: either act 
unilaterally or be prepared to tolerate the unfair practice. In those 
cases in which a multilateral ''judge and jury" is simply unavailable, 
unilateral action under Section 301 remains the only solution. 
Id. at 54. 
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corpus of principles, and more significantly, by the fact that it 
is interpreted from a single perspective. All participants in the 
process, whether from the developed world, or from the 
developing countrylNIC group, weave back and forth between 
these two contrasting cultures, depending on short-term or 
long-term policy goals. In a nutshell, the GATTIWTO 
framework is valuable when it is useful?7 
As a whole, the WTO Agreements are a continuation, rather 
than a reversal, of this trend toward fragmentation of the 
global trading regime. The term "fragmentation" is used here 
not to denote a reversal of the propensity toward trade 
liberalization, but rather, to describe the lingering piecemeal 
structure of the trade regime. The architecture of the WTO 
framework prevails as an assortment of trade arrangements 
mirroring once more the quid pro quo context of the entire 
negotiating process, and its final result. While in theory, the 
underlying philosophy of the multilateral trading order, then 
and now, is one of non-reciprocity, with economic welfare 
advantages outweighing political considerations, reciprocity in 
the multilateral trade order, and not just in the multilateral 
negotiations, has never departed from the global trading 
configuration. Weaker countries in the system, while cognizant 
of the benefits of liberalized trade, cannot afford to sail against 
the winds of the dominant philosophy because of the 
concurrent but contradictory parallel universe that endures 
with the WTO system. 
27. It can also be argued that there are also two competing, incompatible strains 
within the GAT!' structure. "Existing parallel to the illusory rule/power distinction in 
the appreciation of GAT!' law is the myth that the GAT!' promotes only the 
liberalization of trade. Peculiar to the GAT!' orientation is the forced marriage of 
liberal and mercantilistic components ... , creating internal contradictions in the entire 
GATT system as a whole. An economist has rightly dubbed this coupling the 
'liberalization-mercantilism' syndrome. The GATT supports a legal structure composed 
of provisions ensuring the liberalization of trade, but at the same time, allows 
numerous exceptions nullifying each of these fundamental principles. These fatal 
protectionist 'qualifiers' neutralize the liberalizing thrust of the GAT!' and encourage 
participating states to more, rather than less protectionism." Ernesto M. Hizon, The 
Safeguard Measure / VER Dilemma: The Jekyll and Hyde of Trade Protection, 15 Nw J. 
INT'L L.& Bus. 105, 121 (1994). 
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The Uruguay Round came to a successful photo finish 
primarily because of the fear that the failure of the Round 
would result in a splintering of the world into three giant 
trading blocs in Europe, the Americas and East Asia. In the 
end, the final document depended on a break in the deadlock 
between the United States and Europe, with compromises in 
contentious areas such as agriculture, textiles and the film 
industry. 
From all indications, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
forecasts interminable negotiations that go beyond the scope of 
the concluded agreement. The battle lines between the 
developing world, the NICs, and the developed countries are 
once again drawn by the unyielding rush of proposals to 
include linkages between trade and formerly non-trade related 
issues such as the environment, labor standards, government 
corruption, anti-competitive practices, business practices 
(keiretsu in Japan, chaebol in Korea), child labor, and to a 
lesser extent, human rights. At the first WTO Ministerial 
conference held in Singapore in December of 1996, the cleavage 
between the developing countries and NICs, on the one hand, 
and the developed countries, on the other hand, over the 
subject of linkages was felt. As a compromise the Singapore 
Declaration issued statements that the member states would 
work toward a resolution of these issues, but did not go far 
enough to establish ground rules that would directly link trade 
with non-trade issues.28 
The Darwinian rule of the fittest and strongest in the WTO 
world could once more come into play. Plainly stated, these 
proposals are essentially designed, in the words of the former 
Director of Legal Affairs of the GATT, "to permit trade. 
restrictions designed to facilitate or promote a change in 
domestic policies in these areas.,,29 
28. 14 WTO Focus (December 1996). 
29. Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade 
Integration, in ROBERT E. HUDEC, FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, PREREQUISITES 
FOR FREE TRADE?, Vol. 2 LEGAL ANALYSIS 21, 36 (1996). 
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III. THE MALIGNED NIC STIMULUS 
It is imperative to bear in mind that the GATT rules were 
written in the context of the postwar economic situation, and 
presumed a particular economic hierarchy of nations, in which 
the competitive positions of each were starkly differentiated. 
The emergence of the NICs and the unfolding of their unique 
design on development wrecked havoc on the fragile balance of 
trade obligations that had arisen from the specific postwar 
economic milieu. Trade liberalization in the form of lower 
tariffs and vigilant non-discrimination in the exchange of 
goods, under the same GATT rules, would not have been 
sufficient to hold the NIC advance in check. 
East Asia's trade surpluses with the rest of the world 
contrasted with the slow growth among the OECD member 
countries. In the nineties, the global economy slowed down 
considerably. Only the East Asian economies were able to 
maintain high growth rates, although these were also affected 
by the global slowdown, since much of East Asia's trade is 
extra-regional. In the fmal quarter of the twentieth century, 
East Asian exports rose more than thirty fold to about $850 
billion, and its share of world exports from seven to twenty-one 
percent. Some countries with trade deficits orchestrated 
increases in dumping determinations and negotiated voluntary 
export restraints to bypass the GATT proscription on 
quantitative restrictions, while others, such as the U.S., 
instituted special laws that authorized retaliation against 
countries practicing "unfair trade". These contingency 
measures were primarily aimed at the East Asian NICs, whose 
export manufacturing drives continued their momentum, and 
had relatively protected domestic markets.30 
The world economy has changed dramatically since the genesis 
of the liberal world trade system. At the GATT's birth, the 
world was just recovering from a traumatic war, and it was 
hoped that with the installation of a liberalized trading order, 
30. THE WORLD BANK, EAST AsIA'S TRADE AND INVESTMENT 2-5 (1994). 
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the economic seeds of conflict would be minimized, if not 
eliminated altogether. The postwar era also spelled the end of 
colonialism, and thus the gradual independence of erstwhile 
colonies of the Western powers slowly enlarged the GATT's 
membership. However, the political and economic divisions of 
the world were striking: the developing countries were 
guileless bystanders in the development of GATT's rules and 
were uncomfortably trapped in the vicious cycle of merely 
providing commodities and raw materials for the industries of 
the West. 
It is a commonly held belief that the early years of the postwar 
trading system provided developing countries more favorable 
treatment in the GATT. Perhaps from a strictly legalistic and 
amoral point of view, this may be so. The principles of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO), a "soft-law" obligation 
to respect the right to· economic development, became the 
philosophical infrastructure for the General System of 
Preferences (GSP) under which preferential and non-reciprocal 
treatment towards developing countries was recognized.31 
But this myopic, or even rose-colored perspective obscures the 
historical and economic context altogether. Preferential 
treatment was willingly granted in sectors that posed no 
threat, or that were even beneficial to the domestic industries ' 
concerned.32 Under the GATT, and the WTO, members have 
the right to voluntarily give tariff preferences to developing 
countries.33 Since these preferences are accorded on an 
autonomous basis, they could be withdrawn at any time in 
whole or in part, or conditions that may be trade or non-trade 
related, may be attached to them. There is nothing a donee 
31. Although the GSP was incorporated into the GAT!', it was granted by 
individual countries in the nature of a voluntary contractual obligation, with no 
pretense of being a defInite obligation under customary international law. No legal 
theory was formulated to determine the specifIc rights and duties under GSP. See 
HUDEC, supra note 16, at 186-196. 
32. HUDEC, supra'note 16, at 189. 
33. Decision of the Contracting Parties to GAIT of 28 November 1979 on 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, 26 BISD 203 (1990). 
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nation could do that could prevent the donor country from 
linlring preferential treatment with certain domestic policies.34 
For some developing countries, such as the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) former colonies of the European Union 
nations, special treatment under the Lome Convention's ACP 
Preferential Agreements was a stimulus to continue supplying 
primary commodities to their former colonial masters. This 
trapped them into the comfort of lingering dependency.35 But 
once these preferences allowed certain imports to compete 
effectively with domestic firms, then the preferences were cut 
off by "graduating" the entitled imports or by arresting their 
onslaught by tightening contingency protection. In both cases, 
developing countries would be foolhardy to threaten retaliation 
available to them even under the GATT rules, as their weaker 
economic position and smaller markets would be no match for a 
potentially dangerous response from developed countries. In 
the end, it is still the relative strategic economic circumstances 
of trading countries that determine the use of the GATT legal 
superstructure. 
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY FROM THE EAST ASIAN NIC 
PERSPECTIVE 
In cold, objective terms, the world in 1947 at the inception of 
GATT, was divided into the "haves" and "have-nots". In the 
1950s, the economic structures of the developing countries were 
sadly alike. Adopting policies that were direct interventions of 
private economic activity, the developing nations were not only 
poor, with low savings and employment rates, but productivity 
and wages were low, and credit was scarce. While the 
developing countries' share of world GNP fell, the OECD 
economies were growing at a fast clip. 
In the late 1950s and in the 1960s, some developing countries, 
notably those in East Asia, moved from primary commodity 
34. Roessler, supra note 29, at 39-40. 
35. See EUROPEAN TRADE POLICIES AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD (L.B.M. Mennes 
& J. Kol eds., 1988). 
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exporters to import-substitution industrialization, which 
created incentives for production in the domestic market by 
protecting local "infant industries". However, this strategy 
proved detrimental to overall growth by causing inefficiencies 
in obtaining materials, entrenching domestic monopolies and 
limiting the size of the market.36 Foreign exchange rates were 
overvalued in the guise of preventing shortages of the precious 
foreign currency. Productivity lagged and export growth 
slowed. This evolution from land-intensive to labor-intensive 
production was followed by a move to an export-oriented 
industrialization policy. This shift required the formation of 
more capital-intensive industries and the targeting of 
international markets over the domestic market.37 
The countries that switched to more export-oriented policies, 
particularly those in East Asia, found significant increases in 
their output, employment and productivity. Foreign exchange 
rates were brought down to more realistic levels, and access to 
intermediate goods and raw materials was facilitated. 
Incentives were instituted for a wide variety of goods, 
especially for exportable commodities and manufactures. 
Although the rapid economic expansion of the world economy 
at this time did not cause as much dislocation as it would have 
in a period of lower growth, the export promotion policies of 
some of the developing countries made them significant 
competitors for manufactures in the international market.3s 
36. Critics of the infant-industry assumptions have argued that once government 
begins to intervene in favor of import-competing industries, every failing industry 
would seek government aid. This, however, did not occur in the case of the successful 
East Asian economies, which diverted to an export-based market-drive 
industrialization. Article XVIII of the GATT permits special infant-industry 
protection, but it requires a GATT review of the economic justification. Because of the 
cumbersome process, the provision has been hardly used. Developed countries have 
not often resorted to requiring the compliance with Article XVIII due the "seeming 
impossibility of the task." Developing countries have simply tried to evade it. See 
HUDEC, supra note 16, at 172. 
37. See Tan..Jun Cheng, Political Regime and Development Strategies: South /Wrea 
and Taiwan, in MANuFACTURING MIRACLES: PATHS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND EAST AsIA (Gary Gereffi & Donald Wyman eds., 1990). 
38. ANNE O. KRUEGER, PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 363-367 
(990). 
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The rising import of manufactures affected the labor-intensive 
industries in developed countries, although the evidence shows 
that most of these difficulties would have been present anyway. 
Increased protection from developed country markets did not 
substantially reduce the growth of imports from less developed 
countries (LDCs),39 except for textiles and apparel. An open 
trading system was essential for the export strategies of the 
LDCs. In this sense, the fortunes of the successful developing 
countries were intimately related to the continuing economic 
advancement of the developed countries and the severity of 
their protectionist measures.40 
In the 1970s,· the first-tier East Asian NICs upgraded their 
manufacturing to higher value-added products, conceding the 
labor-intensive, low-wage manufacturing sector to the second-
tier East Asian NICs, led by the ASEAN countries.41 The 
ASEAN countries more or less followed the same pattern as the 
first-tier countries, with the notable exception of Singapore, 
which did not pursue an import-substitution policy because of 
its small domestic market while. While ASEAN countries were 
initially primary commodity exporting countries coming out of 
colonialism, their manufactures exceeded commodities by the 
mid-1980s, except for oil-exporting Indonesia and Brunei.42 
The sharp rise of the Japanese yen and the New Taiwan dollar 
in the latter half of the1980s, sparked a round of first-tier NIC 
investment In the lower-cost ASEAN NIC economies,43 
39. See H. Hughes & A.O. Krueger, Effects of Protection in Developed Countries on 
Developing Countries' Exports of Manufactures, in AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONS (R. 
Baldwin & A.O. Krueger eds., 1984). 
40. KRUEGER, supra note 38, at 374-375. 
41. See CHOWDHURY & ISLAM, supra note 12, at 1-56. 
42. A wide range of articles and books discuss the Southeast Asian economic 
success story, particularly the shift from commodity exports to manufacturing. See, e.g. 
Linda Y.C. Lim, Southeast Asia: Success Through International Openness, in GLOBAL 
CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE 238-271 (Barbara Stallings ed., 1995); EXPORT-LED 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Eddy Lee ed., Maruzen Asia for the 
International Labour Organisation 1981); EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES AND INDUSTRIAL 
EMPLOYMENT IN AsIA (Eddy Lee ed., Asian Employment Programme of the 
International Labour Organisation 1984); MOHAMMED ARIFF & HAL HILL, EXPORT-
ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE ASEAN EXPERIENCE (1985), cited in Stallings, 
supra. 
43. See FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ASEAN (Soon Lee Ying ed., Malaysian 
Economic Association 1990); PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, THE NEW WAVE OF JAPANESE 
INVESTMENT IN ASEAN: DETERMINANTS AND PROSPECTS (Institute of Southeast Asian 
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especially in industries like consumer electronics and 
household appliances. Similarly affected European companies 
also shifted some of their manufacturing· to the ASEAN 
countries.44 
The inroads made by the East Asian NICs into the developed 
country markets spurred a wave of protectionism. The two 
fundamental principles of the GATT trading system, non-
discrimination and multilateralism, were threatened with the 
spread of bilateralism, the demand for reciprocity and 
differential treatment.45 From the 1970s and into the 1980s, 
bilateral orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs) and VERs 
targeted products from Japan and the East Asian NICs.46 
The second half of the 1980s saw a transformation of trade 
policy on the part of the OECD countries. The United States 
led the way by shifting its emphasis from ad hoc bilateral 
agreements to more concrete measures to stem the threat from 
the East Asian NICs. The 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act defined a broad range of "unfair" trade 
practices, and mandated the U.S. Trade Representative to take 
punitive measures against the violators under Section 301 of 
the Act and Super 301.47 One of the more recent GATT Trade 
Policy Reviews reported that nine of the thirteen active cases 
between July 1991 and June 1993 were directed against 
developing countries, and that eight of them concerned 
intellectual property rights.48 
From this point on, the United States emphasized the 
protection of intellectual property rights, advocated the 
Studies 1990); DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AsIA'S DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE AsIA-PACIFIC REGION (Eric D. Ramstetter ed. 1991); LINA 
Y.C. LIM & PANG ENG FONG, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN 
MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, TAIWAN AND THAILAND (OECD Development Centre 1991). 
44. Lim, supra note 42, at 251. 
45. See Beth Yarbrough & Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation in the Liberalization of 
International Trade: After Hegemony, What?, 41 INT'L ORG. (1987). 
46. See Vinod Aggarwal, et aI., The Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism, 81 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 2 (1987). 
47. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act has been amended many times, most 
recently by the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 19 U.S.C. §2411. 
48. GATT, 1 TRADE POLICY REVIEW 3 (1994). 
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enlargement of the scope of the GATT to services, and sought 
the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. In 1989, the U.S. 
graduated the East Asian NICs from their less-developed 
country status by removing their privileges under the GSP 
system. As Japan turned its attention to Asia in the 1990s and 
increased its investments there, Western observers were 
increasingly worried that Japan's example would encourage 
the rest of the region to adopt its formula of export-led growth 
and barriers to imports.49 
Due to the emergence of the East Asian NICs, the so-called 
North-South dichotomy that also divided East from West, has 
disappeared. Economic interdependence has increased, even as 
the political divisions and ideologies in the world have 
decreased. Within the OECD club, as well as within the circle 
of third world countries, there is rapidly growing 
differentiation. For instance, the average per capita GDP of 
the East Asian NIC has exceeded $8,000· (i.e. more than that of 
some European nations), while the nations in sub-Saharan 
Mrica have a per capita' GDP of only $800. Indeed, the term 
"Third World" that was used to represent the fraternity of 
developing countries at the start of the GATT system has 
become anachronistic.50 The "East Asian Miracle" has 
expanded the role of developing countries in the world trading 
system, and has both directly and indirectly shaped its future. 
The near parity in economic levels has been accomplished by 
means of vastly dissimilar approaches to development. It is 
this ideological Scylla and Charybdis in tactics that leads to 
disputes in international trade. This strategic divergence could 
also be said to have greatly influenced the reactive course 
subsequent international trade negotiations would take. 
49. Japan's New Identity, Bus. WEEK, April 10, 1995, at 112. This article 
reported the Deutsche Bank's estimate that in 1994, Japan's direct investment in East 
Asia totaled $64 billion as against the United States' $26 billion and $7 billion from 
Germany. In 1993, East Asia took 36% of Japan's exports, while the U.S. had only 
17%, and Germany and France, less than 10% each. 
50. Barbara Stallings, The New International Context of Development, in GLOBAL 
CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at 349. 
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Asian models of development relied on institutional steps to 
promote exports, making full use of industrial policy to promote 
certain sectors of the economy. These measures included inter 
alia subsidized credit, government assistance with marketing 
strategies, and access to imported technology, all in the context 
of a protected domestic market. The Asian strategy invested 
heavily in the growth of human capital and physical facilities.51 
Aside from the Western democracies, only the East Asian NICs 
have overcome the barriers to development. A thought-
provoking study of the East Asian high-performing economies' 
(HPEs) developmental model attributes their performance to 
the principle of "shared growth": the building of a broad, 
legitimating consensus between government, business 
community and citizenry in the shaping of economic policy 
toward rapid economic growth. Since each of the constituent 
groups are granted bargaining power in exchange for 
information to formulate rational economic policies, long-term 
economic goals could be effectively implemented.52 
In its World Development Report 1991, the World Bank 
expanded on the neoclassical interpretation of East Asia's 
phenomenal success by underscoring effective but carefully 
limited government activism. In this market-friendly strategy, 
government's role is to ensure adequate investment in human 
resources, furnish incentives for the private sector, keep an 
open economy for international trade, and maintain a stable 
macroeconomic environment. Interventions should be market-
friendly in order to be beneficial. In its study of the policies of 
developing economies, the World Bank concludes that non-
market mechanisms to guide resource allocation were in fact 
detrimental to economic development.53 
51. See WORLD BANK, THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PuBuc 
POUCY (1993) [hereinafter THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE]; WORLD BANK, WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1991). See also JOSE EDGARDO CAMPOS & HILTON L. RooT, 
THE KEy TO THE AsIAN MIRACLE, MAKING SHARED GROWTH CREDIBLE (The Brookings 
Institution, 1996). 
52. CAMPOS & RooT, supra note 52. 
53. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 51. 
29
Hizon: Virtual Reality and Reality
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
110 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 5:1 
In its path-breaking 1993 report on the East Asian Miracle,54 
the World Bank describes the carefully managed state 
interventions that complemented the policy of maintaining 
macroeconomic fundamentals by the East Asian NICs.55 These 
selective mechanisms, which addressed "coordination failures" 
in the working of markets, include mild fmancial repression 
(e.g., keeping interest rates low), directed credit, selective 
industrial promotion, and trade policies that push 
nontraditional exports. These pragmatic, flexible policy 
instruments were responses that promoted cooperative 
behavior among private firms and set· performance-based 
standards for success. A strong institutional framework - a 
highly qualified and apolitical civil service - enhanced the 
ability to monitor performance in such a "controlled" 
competitive environment.56 However, export subsidies and 
54. THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE, supra note 51. 
55. Among the macroeconomic fundamentals mentioned by the World Bank are 
high investments in human capital, a stable and secure fmancial system, limited price 
distortions, and openness to foreign technology. THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE, supra note 
51. 
56. THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE, supra note 51, at 10-11. The World Bank Report 
further elucidates on the argument of cooperative behavior and competitive discipline 
in this way: 
Competitive discipline is crucial to efficient investment. Most 
economies employ only market-based competition. We argue that 
some HPAEs (Highly Performing Asian Economies) have gone a step 
further by creating contests that combine competition with the 
benefits of cooperation among firms and between government and the 
private sector. Such contests range from very simple non-market 
allocation rules, such as access to rationed credit for exporters, to very 
complex coordination of private investment in the government-
business deliberation councils of Japan and Korea. The key feature of 
each contest, however, is that the government distributes rewards --
often access to credit or foreign exchange .- on the basis of 
performance, which the government and competing firms monitor. 
To succeed, selective interventions must be disciplined by competition 
via either markets or contest. 
It should be clarified at this point, however, that while the Bank Report advances 
this framework to interpret data on the East Asian NICs, it acknowledges differences 
in the way each of the NICs made use of this general approach for its own 
macroeconomic policies. For example, the first-tier NICs represented by Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, emulating Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, first went through a 
phase of import-substitution before they shifted to a pro-export regime that co-existed 
with a moderate but highly variable protection of the domestic market. Hong Kong, 
being a laissez faire state from time immemorial, always had a strong bias in favor of 
exports. In the case of the second-tier NICs led by the Southeast Asian states 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, and lately, the Philippines, the export push in the 
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directed-credit programs linked to exports, which required 
highly directed institutional interventions, were deemed 
inconsistent with the GATT framework and often invited 
retaliation from the industrial country members.57 
Anne Krueger summarized the East Asian experience when 
. she described the phenomenon of East Asian growth "as arising 
out of the use of the international economy to enable the 
country rely on comparative advantage in allocating 
resources.,,58 It was the external economic conditions that 
compelled the East Asian NICs to practice state intervention 
and macroeconomic management to compete effectively in the 
world markets, and later, to liberalize their economies to 
respond to the changes in the global market. There was 
nothing inherently unique in the East Asian success story; the 
essential ingredients - avoidance of price and trade 
distortions, combined with macroeconomic stability - can be 
copied by other developing countries. What sets the East Asian 
experience apart is the "effective blending of the roles of 
market and state" that makes it possible to get the most out of 
its trade reforms and public expenditures.59 
The NICs' policy orientations, rather than a conscious effort to 
skirt international trade rules and exploit preferential 
treatment, were in the nature of necessary "mediated 
responses" determined by factors that were necessary to adjust 
to the existing economic environment. Certainly the NICs 
would never have been able to improve their competitiveness in 
the world market had they not been able to promote exports 
initially by shielding their local market. They would have been 
eternally ensconced in the primary commodity or import 
substitution phase of their economic development. 
1980s, was accompanied by less state interventions and relied and more broadly based 
market incentives and direct foreign investment. 
[d. at 12-13. 
57. [d. at 25. 
58. ANNE O. KRUEGER, TRADE POLICIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS 25 (The 
Brookings Institution 1995). 
59. VINOD THOMAS & YAN WANG, THE LESSONS OF EAST AsIA, GoVERNMENT 
POLICY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH, Is EAST AsIA AN EXCEPTION'? 18 (The World Bank 
1993). 
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The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) Report on the implications of the Uruguay Round 
agreements for the trade and development policies of 
developing countries presents the balanced view of the East 
Asian development model: 
In addition to sound macroeconomic policies, successful 
countries have used a number of selective policies and 
measures to influence the direction and level of investment, to 
increase . profitability of exports, to provide incentives for 
accumulating technological capabilities, to promote technology 
transfer to domestic enterprises and to reduce risks of 
exporting firms. In this context, these countries have deployed 
"a variety of policy instruments, including production subsidy, 
export subsidy, investment-related measures such as export 
obligation, domestic content requirements, technology transfer 
clauses, risk-sharing insurance and export-fmancing schemes.6o 
The neoclassical explanation for the so-called East Asian 
Miracle proceeds from the premise that these countries adopted 
rational, market-oriented policies by liberalizing imports, 
adopting realistic exchange rates, and granting incentives for 
exports. In other words, industrial policy shaped an 
environment in which prices in the international market 
dictated its direction. Lower capital/output ratios, the 
elimination of inefficient "infant industries" and the challenge 
to increase competitiveness in the global market provided the 
impetus for higher growth and allowed for adjustments in the 
"oil shock" debt crisis-ridden years of the 1970s.61 
60. UNCTAD" SECRETARIAT, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY RoUND AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE TRADING PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, EXPANSION OF TRADING OPPORTUNITIES To THE YEAR 2000 FOR AsIA-
PACIFIC DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 102 n.3 (1995) [hereinafter UNCTAD REPORT]. 
61. The neoclassical accounts of the East Asian experience can be found in the 
following works: BELA BALASSA, supra note 12; JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FOREIGN TRADE 
REGIMES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE ANATOMY AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES (1978); Gustav Ranis, EMPLOYMENT, INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH IN THE EAST AsIAN CONTEXT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 
Paper Presented at the Conference on Experiences and Lessons of Small Open 
Economies, Santiago, Chile (1981). 
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The exegesis of neoclassical economics has its share of critics. 
The criticism points out the strong interventionist hand of the 
state in promoting a "developmental state", which could not 
justify the use of neoclassical analysis. In the view of the 
critics, the NICs developed a strategy of "acquired dynamic 
comparative advantage" rather than "endowed static 
comparative advantage". Echoing the Japanese model, the 
successful NICs directed capital, production and labor out of 
declining sectors, and into more competitive ones, in response 
to long-term opportunities in the international market. 
Blessed with a very capable administrative apparatus ,62 
measures were efficiently carried out, on the demand side by 
restricting foreign competition, and on the supply side by 
controlling factor prices. 
In contrast, the United States underscores the removal of 
impediments, such as overvalued exchange rates, export taxes, 
and bureaucratic regulation, which it believes would 
automatically increase exports. Import liberalization 
complements the reduction of export barriers because the 
increase in access to cheaper inputs and foreign competition by 
itself raises the level of competitiveness of manufactures. The 
decline of America's hegemony;3 during the 1980s meant an 
unwillingness to underwrite the maintenance of the liberal 
trading order it created. Increasing U.S. trade deficits caused 
by rising imports affecting domestic industries pointed to an 
overall decline in the competitiveness of U.S. industry, even 
threatening the critical high-technology sector, once thought to 
be a traditional strength of the United States. 
62. South Korea and Taiwan inherited from Japanese colonial rule an efficient 
administrative bureaucracy, a well educated populated, modern infrastructure and a 
good agricultural system The decolonization process that occurred after their 
independence included an extensive land reform program, which provided the 
foundation for the sustained growth of agriculture and the capital needed to support 
industrialization. See Yun-han Chu, The East Asian NICs: A State-Led Path to the 
Developed World, in GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at 199, 201-
202. 
63. The overall decline in America's economic hegemony in the 1980s spawned 
"declinist" literature, which associated a liberal economic order with the presence of a 
hegemonic state such as Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the U.S. in the 
postwar era See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (1981); 
RoBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987); PAUL 
KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1987). 
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These problems were explained by market intervention by 
foreign states. The promotion of key industries, which created 
competitive advantage and skewed the international division of 
labor, was deemed to be the culprit. Another factor was said to 
be structural differences in national political-economic systems, 
which gave firms in these countries an unfair competitive 
advantage.64 In the view of these analysts, the U.S. was a 
victim to strategic trade policies foisted by Japan, Europe and 
the NICs of East Asia and Latin America.65 Of course, it was 
not as significant to the United States that, through its defense 
and research programs, subsidies were· provided to the 
computer, semiconductor, nuclear power, aerospace and 
pharmaceutical industries - all of which led, naturally, to a 
technological edge in these areas.66 But in the late 1980s, 
industrial sectors that were once world leaders - such as steel, 
semiconductors, automobiles and microelectronics - came 
under intense competition,67 and reflected the accelerating 
decline of America's economic and strategic place in the world 
economy.68 . 
In the classic, updated edition of the most influential and 
widely read analysis of the U.S. trade-policy-making system, 
I.M. Destler describes the mood in the 1980s: 
In this atmosphere of broad trade frustration, 
many became deeply skeptical about the liberal 
64. An entire book industry sprouted to point the fmger at Japan and the East 
Asian NICs as the cause for the disequilibrium in the trading system. Among the 
notable "Japan-bashing" tomes is CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES: How WE 
ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD (1988). The main object of attack was Japan's 
keiretsu system (i.e., formal and informal links among enterprises and banks within 
large industrial groupings which allow for lower credit, exclusive market distribution, 
and discrimination against imports) and emulations thereof in the NICs (e.g. the 
chaebol in South Korea). 
65. TALKING TRADE, U.S. POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 7-8 (Robert S. 
Walters ed., 1993) !hereinafter TALKING TRADEJ. The literature on strategic trade 
policy includes AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION: GoVERNMENT 
POLICIES AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES (John Zysman & Laura Tyson eds., 1983); 
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Paul Krugman 
ed., 1986); THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY (Claude Barfield & William Schambra 
eds., American Enterprise Institute 1986). 
66. TALKING TRADE, supra note 65, at II. 
67. I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 48 (1995). 
68. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1987). 
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image of a world growing more and more open, 
governed increasingly by common rules of 
nondiscrimination in trade. What they came to 
see was an "unfair" world where other nations 
played loose with the rules and "nice guys" were 
likely to finish last. They were willing to 
compete, but they demanded a "level playing 
field," not one tilted against the United States.69 
115 
It was flo surprise that in the 1980s, many in the United States 
believed that the GATT was not effective. With the growing 
importance of international investment and services, and the 
decreasing competitiveness in goods, the GATT, which covered 
only trade in goods, was become increasingly irrelevant.7o 
Thus, U.S. trade policy began to stress more exacting levels of 
protection (or, conversely, degrees of market access), and was 
not satisfied with mere reciprocal changes in protection.71 The 
focus of trade strategy thus shifted to a sector- and results-
oriented policy, from one that stressed the process of 
liberalization.72 It becomes painfully clear, contrary to any 
assertion by any party of its benevolence in favoring any free 
trade order, that the liberal trading system was useful only 
insofar as it could satisfy national trade interests. 
The same can be said of the European Union's trade policy. 
The EU's deepening integration and subsequent expansion to 
include twelve, and then fifteen members, has made the 
regional economic grouping a stronger player, and potentially 
the strongest participant in international trade. To a large 
extent, the formulation of rules for the internal market, by 
themselves, represent the most significant trade policy strategy 
in relation to the rest of the world. To date, the question of the 
consistency of the EUs single market with Article XXIV of the 
GATT Agreement and with the general principle of non-
69. DESTLER, supra note 67, at 9 (emphasis added). 
70. THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTI', RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION 
IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 10-11 (Institute for International Economics 1994). 
71. See William R. Cline, Reciprocity: A New Approach to World Trade Policy? 7 
POLICY ANALYSES IN INT'L ECON 2, 7 (1982). 
72. BAYARD & ELLIOTI', supra note 70, at 11. 
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discrimination, has never been satisfactorily resolved.73 
Furthermore, the EUs preferential bilateral accords with the 
new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Mediterranean states, and Mrican, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) former colonies under the Lome Convention - forming a 
perplexing potpourri of arrangements raise further 
questions regarding their compatibility with the GATT. The 
evolution to the WTO has yet to settle these contradictions. 
Although the formation of the EU's single market was guided 
by a liberal economic vision committed to the reduction of 
internal and external barriers, protectionism comes to the fore 
through its "complex and multi-layered process of trade policy 
formulation and implementation."74 The liberal philosophy of 
the European integration process clashes with the mercantilist 
forces unleashed at the lower administrative echelons. Often, 
European officials at the bureaucratic levels can be influenced 
by industries with whom they interact. This seeming disparity 
in theory and practice has been defined as a paradox of 
liberalism confmed by pragmatism.75 With the European 
Commission striving to pull trade and policy away from the EU 
member states, it needs to appear to be sympathetic to 
domestic industrial interests.76 
Like the United States, the European Community in the early 
1980s entered into discriminatory bilateral and sectoral 
arrangements with countries outside the circle of former 
European colonies with which it had preferential agreements.77 
But in the latter part of the 1980s and well into the 1990s, the 
Commission preferred to use more legalistic and sophisticated 
trade instruments. Accordingly, it engaged in vigorous 
73. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW 
DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22-50 (Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya 
eds., 1993). 
74. Lars Anell, Concluding Remarks by Chairman of the GATT Council, April 15-
16, 1991,2 GAT!' TRADE POllCY REVIEW 3 (1991). 
75. Thomas R. Howell, Rosemary E. Gwynn & R. Michael Gadbaw, European 
Community, in CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS, TRADE POLICIES IN THE 1990s 389-468 
(1992) [hereinafter CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS). 
76. Id. at 397. 
77. Gardner Paterson, The European Community as a Threat to the System, in 
TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980s 230-231 (William R. Cline ed., 1983). 
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application of anti-dumping laws, rules of origin, and the New 
Commercial Policy Instrument, which was patterned after the 
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.78 But while the U.S. 
resorted to "aggressive unilateralism" to punish what it 
considered to be "unfair" trade practices, the EU responded to 
trade pressures via its industrial policy within the common 
market, notably through the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), export monitoring of competitive foreign suppliers, 
government rationalization schemes, and massive regional and 
research subsidies. Moreover, all the EU's major temperate-
zone agricultural commodities, except oilseeds, are isolated 
from external competition through the Community's variable 
import levies. In most sensitive sectors, tariffs have given way 
to anti-dumping, the most frequently used trade instrument.19 
v. THE CONCEPT OF "FAIR": WHEN FAIR IS UNFAIR 
The question inevitably arises as to what constitutes "unfair 
trade" among states. It is a fiction to claim that the 
GATTIWTO regime is not an institutional mechanism to 
enforce a exclusive set of economic beliefs and values. 
Although the trend towards "liberalization" has achieved a 
broad consensus, as the Uruguay Round attests, there are 
numerous fundamental contentious matters that have yet to be 
resolved. 
First and foremost: What is "unfair"? Is a measure unfair if it 
is not consistent with the GATT, or when it does not conform to 
certain institutional structures and economic practices? And if 
the GATT rules are changed, as they have been to a certain 
extent in the WTO Agreements, do previously "fair" practices 
become "unfair", or vice-versa? Is there a single defmitive, 
78. See Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, ANTIDUMPING AND OTHER TRADE 
PROTECTION LAws OF THE EEC (1990); RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Edwin Vermulst, Paul Waer, & Jacques Bourgeois eds., 1994) 
[hereinafter RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADEJ. Professor Meessen retorts 
that Europe's arsenal of trade measures is not impressive. Karl M. Meessen, Europe en 
Route to 1992: The Completion of the Internal Market and Its Impact on Non-
Europeans, 23 INT'L LAw. 359 (Summer 1989). 
79. See 1 GATT TRADE POL'Y REv. 2-6 (1993). 
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appropriate role for the state in a country's economic 
development? If the managed market intervention on the part 
of the East Asian NICs, purportedly contrary to liberal trade 
principles, is unfair, then punitive unilateral measures that 
determine whether another state's trade practices, agricultural 
subsidies, or overzealous anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
determinations are equally, if not more, unfair. Even the 
threat of imposing such measures, although technically 
permissible as long as they are not yet in effect, does not 
constitute "fair" trade in view of the asymmetrical economic 
relationships in the trading system. It is about time that even 
the determination of "fairness" be fair. 
Many newly industrializing countries (e.g. Taiwan, Korea and 
Brazil) which previously fostered an industrial policy to 
promote their domestic industries, have embraced many of the 
GATTIWTO regulatory mechanisms of their own volition. This 
movement away from restrictive border measures sprung from 
a realization that such measures, in the long term, insulate 
domestic industries from foreign competitive pressures and 
may prevent them from maintaining their international 
competitive edge. It is clear, however, that these countries 
would not have reached this stage, if the NICs had not pursued 
the carefully managed, rational market interventions that 
purportedly violated the GATT value system. The GATT's 
Holy Grail is a market where government interference is 
restrained. But can Paradise be found on GATTIWTO earth? 
American attorneys who have frequently represented local 
parties against Japanese and other foreign firms in 301 cases, 
as well as others who believe that the U.S. should not give up 
its ability to react unilaterally, admit that because there is 
really no "international consensus as to what constitutes 
acceptable behavior in the pursuit of national interests, the 
GATT cannot be said currently to represent a mechanism for 
enforcing a comprehensive set of shared economic and 
industrial policy values. Absent mutual consensus on the 
values and rules which are being enforced, the elaboration and 
strengthening of GATT dispute resolution mechanisms cannot 
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succeed in mediating fundamental conflicts arising out of the 
pursuit of national commercial advantage.'180 
VI. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
The 1994 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) contained in the Uruguay 
Round agreements81 stands as the centerpiece of the WTO 
system. The DSU "judicializes'182 what once was a dispute 
settlement procedure based on compromise. The former 
"contracting parties" of the GATT are now "members" of the 
WTO. The main organ of the WTO is the ministerial 
conference, which meets every two years. The body of members 
form the WTO Council, which is in turn divided into three 
councils: the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade 
in Services, and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights. When the WTO Council meets en 
toto to discuss a case under the dispute settlement procedure, 
the Council acts as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The 
DSU serves as the main vehicle to enforce the rights and 
obligations under all the "covered agreements.'183 These 
80. Thomas R. Howell & Alan Wm. Wolff, Introduction, in CONFLICT AMONG 
NATIONS, supra note 75, at 15. 
81. The agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round are attached as Annexes to 
the main Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. See Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO AGREEMENTl, Apr. 15, 
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations [hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTSl. Annex 1 includes the WTO 
AGREEMENT, together with a number of covered agreements. Annex 2 contains the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
[hereinafter DSU]. Annex 3 contains the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and Annex 
4 includes four plurilateral trade agreements (covering civil aircraft, government 
procurement, dairy and bovine meat products) which are not automatically covered by 
the dispute settlement procedure. Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Art. XIV in Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
82. Pieter-Jan Kuyper, The New WTO Dispute Settlement System .. the Impact on 
the Community. 
83. The "covered agreements" under the WTO umbrella are enumerated in Annex 
1, to wit: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Article II:I(b) of GATT 1994; Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XVII of the GATT 1994; Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions of 
GATT 1994; Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994; 
Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under GATT 1994; Understanding 
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"covered agreements" compnse the multilateral trade 
agreements that bind all WTO members. With respect to the 
plurilateral trade agreements, which do not bind all WTO 
members, each them contains provisions according to which 
disputes arising thereunder may be settled in accordance with 
the DSU.84 
The dispute settlement process of the WTO explicitly aspires to 
provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system. It does so by preserving the rights and obligations of 
its members under the covered substantive agreements, and by 
clarifying the existing provisions of those agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
internationallaw,85 within a set of deadlines and in conformity 
with a prescribed procedure. The DSB, acting as a plenary 
organ, has the power to make decisions by "negative 
consensus", whereby a matter submitted for consideration is 
deemed decided if no member, present at the meeting of the 
DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the 
proposed decision.86 These decisions can be interposed before 
the adoption of a panel, after the adoption of a panel report or 
appellate body ruling, and concurrently with the authorization 
of countermeasures by suspension of concessions or obligations. 
From all indications, the WTO dispute procedure has attracted 
the interest of more member states, whereas the previous 
GATT dispute settlement procedures attracted only lukewarm 
reception. As of January 14, 1999, 157 requests for 
consultation have been presented to the WTO, which number 
on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994; Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 
1994; Agreement on Agriculture; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, the Customs Valuation 
Agreement; Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; Agreement on Rules of Origin; 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures; Agreement on Safeguards; General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and its Annexes; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS). See WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 81. 
84. DSU, supra note 81, art. 2:1. 
85. DSU, supra note 81, art. 3:2. 
86. DSU, supra note 81, art. 2:4. 
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already exceeds half the number of cases filed during the entire 
life of the GATT, from 1948 to 1994. One hundred twenty of 
the cases presented to the WTO have materialized into distinct 
matters that may lead to panel reports. Eighty-eight of these 
matters were filed by developed country members, and twenty-
nine by developing country members; four matters were filed 
jointly by developed and developing country members. Of 
these matters, 18 cases are completed, while 30 were either 
settled or are inactive.87 In its newsletter (WTO Focus), the 
WTO Secretariat has assessed the performance of the WTO 
dispute settlement record in comparison to that of the earlier 
GATT system as follows: 
about one quarter of the disputes are resolved 
by the parties themselves at the initial 
consultation stage; 
members are actively using the appeals 
procedure, with all panel reports issued so far 
being brought to the Appellate Body for a final 
ruling; 
the improved mechanism has enabled adoption 
by the DSB of all the Appellate Body reports 
and panel reports as modified by them that 
have so far been issued, unlike under the old 
GATT, when adoption took time and a number 
of panel reports were never adopted at all; 
developing countries have become active users 
of the procedures.88 
Under the former GATT dispute settlement scheme, the "three 
Cs" - conciliation, consensus and compromise - formed the 
core of conflict-resolution. Trade conflicts were resolved 
87. World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-or-play of WTO Disputes, 
WTO BULLETIN 1, 27-28 (Jan. 14, 1999) 
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>. 
88. WTO Focus 21 (1997). 
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through negotiation rather than litigation.89 Article XXII of 
GATT 1947 merely provided that each contracting party should 
accord "sympathetic consideration" to, and afford adequate 
opportunity for consultation regarding, the representations of 
another party.90 Article XXIII of GATT 1947 provides the legal 
foundation for the 1979 Tokyo Round Understanding,91 which 
formalized the panel proceeding created by request of the 
complaining party. The panel proceeding paved the way for a 
more adversarial type of conflict-resolution among GATT 
parties.92 If the panel's recommendation was not followed and 
no satisfactory adjustment was made by the party concerned, 
the GATT Contracting Parties (acting asa whole) could 
authorize an individual contracting party to retaliate by 
suspending concessions or obligations, as appropriate.93 Since 
the Contracting Parties' decision to allow countermeasures had 
to be unanimous, the ''losing'' party under a panel 
recommendation could block implementation of the report 
sip1ply by vetoing it.94 The new WTO dispute settlement rules 
preclude this result. 
89. See the lucid comparison of the old and new modes of dispute settlement in 
Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
and its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE L. 2, 
134 (1995). 
90. GATT 1947, art. XXII:1. 
91. Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and 
Surveillance of 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/210 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 
UNDERSTANDING]. 
92. [d., arts. 10-21. 
93. GATT 1947, art. XXIII:2. 
94. Paragraph 4 of the Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT 
in the Field of Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2) annexed to the 1979 
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 91, provides: 
Before bringing a case, contracting parties have exercised their 
judgment as to whether action under Article XXIII:2 would be 
fruitful. Those cases which have come before the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES under this provision have, with few exceptions, been 
brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The aim of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES has always been to secure a positive solution to a dispute. 
A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute is clearly to 
be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first 
objective of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is usually to secure the 
withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be 
inconsistent with the General Agreement. The provision of 
compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal 
of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending 
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Under the DSU, the dispute settlement template acquires a 
more litigious pattern. As under GATT 1947, the WTO process 
begins with a request for consultation. If the matter is not 
resolved in this manner, the member concerned may request a 
panel, unless the DSB decrees otherwise. Once the parties 
agree on the panelists, the panel is formed, which issues a 
report to be considered for adoption by the DSB within 60 days. 
If a negative consensus emerges, appeals of issues of law 
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed 
by the panel may be made to the new Appellate Body of seven 
members. The DSB must adopt the Appellate Body report, and 
the parties must consent to it unconditionally, within 30 days, 
unless a consensus to reject it exists. The existence of an 
Appellate Body signifies a recourse for members who are not 
satisfied with the panel's ruling, giving a more "adjudicative 
flavor" to the panel procedure.95 
It is not the purpose of this section to analyze the minutiae of 
the dispute settlement procedure in the WTO. However, a few 
elements within this paradigm have particular relevance to 
developing countries in general, and the circumstances of East 
Asian NICs in particular. Article 3:12 of the DSU makes an 
express reference to complaints brought by a developing 
country member against a developed country member. In lieu 
of the DSU provisions on consultations, conciliation and 
mediation, and panels, a developing country member has the 
right to invoke the Decision of 5 April 1996 on Procedures 
under Article XXIII of GATT 1947.96 Under this Decision, 
developing country complainants have the option to avail of the 
good offices of the Director-General, acting in an ex officio 
capacity, to facilitate a solution by consulting the parties 
concerned, and with other contracting parties or inter-
the withdrawal of the measures which are inconsistent with the 
General Agreement. The last resort which Article XXIII provides to 
the country invoking this procedure is the possibility of suspending 
the application of concessions or other obligations on a discriminatory 
basis vis-it-vis the other contracting party, subject to authorization by 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES of such measures. Such action has 
only rarely been contemplated and cases taken under Article XXIII:2 
have led to such action in only one case. 
95. Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 89, at 144. 
96. Decision of April 5, 1996 on Procedures under Article XXIII, BISD 148/18. 
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governmental organizations to promote a mutually acceptable 
solution.97 
In theory, the new adjudicatory procedures and safeguards 
built into the DSU regime underscore the importance of the 
rule of law in the organization of world trade. The Uruguay 
Round multilateral agreements added more detail and 
precision to the provisions of GATT 1947 and the Tokyo Round 
agreements.98 The DSU seeks to ensure compliance with 
decisions of the panel and the Appellate Body by bestowing 
upon panel reports and decisions resolved by the Appellate 
Body the quality of judicial formality and finality. In the 
August 1997 issue of its WTO Focus newsletter, the WTO 
Secretariat announced that it had received its 100th request 
for trade dispute resolution, in just a little more than two-and-
a-half years of existence. The average of 40 disputes a year 
represents a vote of confidence by WTO members in the new 
dispute settlement mechanism. The GATT dealt with 300 
disputes in its lifetime, or roughly six disputes a year. 
Developing countries have also become active users of the 
procedures, filing 31 of these cases (29 of which materialized 
into distinct matters). In some instances, developing countries 
have filed cases against other developing countries, a rare 
phenomenon during the GATT era.99 Seventeen Appellate 
Body reports had been adopted as of January 1999.100 
A European scholar has expressed the widely shared view that 
the enlargement of the scope of the dispute settlement 
provisions reduces the possibility for unilateral action by 
certain states, such as the U.S.'s Section 301 and the EU's new 
Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR) (which replaced the 1984 
New Policy Instrument).101 A couple of years ago, the United 
97. Id., arts. 1 & 3. 
98. Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GAT!': From the Havana Charter to 
the World Trade Organization 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 135-136 (1995). 
99. Disputes Reach Century Mark, 21 WTO FOCUS 1 (1997). 
100. World Trade Organization Website, Dispute Settlement, 
<http://www.wto.org>. 
101. Demaret, supra note 98, at 136.· The new Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR), 
Council Regulation 3286/94 specifies internal procedures for actions against 
objectionable or illicit trade practices abroad, including certain areas of services and 
intellectual property. The actions must be authorized under international dispute 
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States served notice of its displeasure at its small share of the 
South Korean auto market by designating South Korea a 
"priority foreign country" (as of October 1, 1997) in the 
automobile sector under "Super 301" of the 1988 Trade Act, 
which still operates by executive order of the U.S. President. 
This procedure allows the U.S. to impose economic sanctions if, 
during the eighteen-month period following the designation, 
the United States is not satisfied with South Korea's efforts to 
remove trade barriers. South Korea, for its part, intends to 
take the dispute to the WTO, if the U.S. unilaterally imposes 
any measures pursuant to Super 301. This would be the acid 
test that would challenge the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism and lay bare the inherent contradictions between 
the "rule of law" it seeks to perpetuate, and the "rule of might" 
wielded by economically powerful countries.102 
True enough, the WTO reports that developing countries are 
becoming active users of the multilateral dispute-settlement 
mechanism, in contrast to their lukewarm reaction thereto 
under the GATT. Developed countries filed the vast majority of 
GATT dispute-settlement cases. No doubt, the near-automatic 
establishment of panels and adoption of their reports, and the 
strict timetables for every phase of the panel process contribute 
settlement provisions. The TBR, which replaces the 1984 New Commercial Policy 
Instrument (Council Regulation 2641184), was patterned after the 301 provisions of the 
U.S. Omnibus Trade Act, but is, in contrast, a law without teeth. The European 
Commission sees the purpose of the regulation as to achieve greater trade 
liberalization within the context of international rules, rather than to protect the 
domestic market. European industries may complain about obstacles to trade having 
an effect on the EU market, but may also complain about obstacles having an effect on 
third-country markets resulting in adverse trade effects to EU industries. See a brief 
description of the TBR in WTO, 1 TRADE POLICY REVIEW, EUROPEAN UNION 65-67 
(1995). 
102. Choi Byung II, "Who's Afraid of Super 30l?" in The Fifth Column, FAR E. 
ECON. REV. 37 (1997). To a certain extent, the facts show that America has a point. 
Only 10,000 American cars were sold to Korea, whereas 200,000 were imported by the 
U.S. from Korea. Washington demands that Korea reduce its import tariff on 
passenger cars from 8% to the U.S. level of 2.5%. The U.S. is also asking Korea to 
change its method of taxing cars based on engine size. The Korean auto manufacturers 
object to the methods used to increase U.S. market share. 
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to the greater reliance on the WTO's dispute settlement 
procedures .103 
Repercussions from a state's non-compliance with an adverse 
ruling remain a remote possibility, as long as one of the parties 
to the dispute does not possess enough economic or political 
might to resist the decision or to retaliate in another sector 
that could cause greater harm to the favored party. In the 
WTO framework, as in the previous GATT system, the design . 
of the legal structure needs to be complemented by the 
willingness of any party, including the more economically 
powerful states, to conform to the results of the DSU rulings 
regardless of the outcome. In 1995, world merchandise trade of 
the four leading exporters and importers - the European 
Union, the United States, Japan and Canada - still covers 
more than half of the world's trade. (The figure is even higher 
if intra-EU trade is included.104) Thus, the full cooperation of 
these countries is of crucial importance. Without their 
acquiescence, the purity of the system is violated, and its 
effectiveness fatally impaired. 
The more ominous threat comes from the use (or threatened 
use) of unilateral measures, when brandished about side by 
side with exhortations to follow the formal procedures in the 
WTO system. The fears over the "Super 301" clause arose 
because at the time when it was unveiled, the GATT dispute 
settlement procedure was then in place, and was perceived to 
be an unsatisfactory alternative to the swifter action that could 
be brought about by Super 301. With an effective multilateral 
dispute resolution mechanism now in place, the rationale for 
"Super 301" or any similar option disappears. Its lingering 
existence discloses the still festering "power-based" regime 
cohabiting with the WTO global trading order. Bilateral 
negotiations outside the WTO framework undermines the 
WTO's fundamental design. 
103. 9 WTO Focus 1-2 (1996). Among the latest panels reflecting this new trend is 
the one requested by the Philippines to examine its complaint against Brazil regarding 
Brazil's imposition of countervailing duties on desiccated coconut from the Philippines. 
The fIrst WTO dispute, which was settled bilaterally, involved Singapore and Malaysia. 
104. 10 WTO Focus 7 (1996). 
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VII. THE "SINGLE UNDERTAKING" AND THE PROBLEM 
OF LINKAGE 
Under the Uruguay Round agreements, the concept of the 
"single undertaking" has been introduced. In contrast to the 
fragmented nature of the Tokyo Round codes and the 
authorized exclusions to the main GATT agreement, the 
commitments under the WTO Agreement encompass all fifteen 
negotiating areas. Accordingly, members (as well as interested 
would-be members) were compelled to accept the composite 
single legal instrument: the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization.105 
The "single undertaking" approach is a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, the definitive singularity of the package of 
commitments appears to guarantee that the members will 
conform to the dispute settlement procedure. Failure to 
observe commitments in one sector allows retaliation in 
another. This concept permits "total bargaining" across issue 
areas, linking one issue with another, such as trade and 
intellectual property rights. It is argued that such form of legal 
consistency will be able to cut across the different institutional 
regimes, injecting predictability into the rules and procedures 
behind governmental actions.106 Moreover, a single package of 
commitments reduces the risk of "free-riding" and forces all the 
member states to comply (except for the four plurilateral 
agreements) with the same obligations.107 
However, this license to retaliate, not only threatens to disturb 
the equilibrium of an international regime, but can effectively 
sanction reversion to a "power" rather than "rule-based" 
105. WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 81, art. XIV. 
106. Roessler, supra note 29, at 47. 
107. In addition to the WTO AGREEMENT, there are four multilateral trade 
agreements, and four plurilateral trade agreements. The four multilateral agreements 
are the following: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services; the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS); and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 
The four plurilateral agreements are: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; the 
Agreement on Government Procurement; the International Dairy Agreement; and the 
International Bovine Meat Agreement. 
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structure within the WTO framework. While its aim to ensure 
the implementation of the dispute settlement is noble in 
theory, cross-retaliation can only be the weapon of the ~trong 
against the weak. A situation where a relatively weaker state· 
loses a case and faces the threat of retaliation if it does not 
comply with an adverse panel or Appellate Body decision would 
not pose any problem, unlike a scenario where a ruling is 
rendered against a more economically powerful party. In the 
former case, retaliation - even if legally available - would be 
ineffectual. 
It IS true that the WTO's dispute settlement procedure has 
procedural constraints intended to prevent possible abuse of 
the option of cross-retaliation. The chief restriction is that the 
complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or 
obligations with respect to the same sector concerned, before 
suspending concessions or obligations with respect to other 
sectors in the agreement. lOB However, the complaining party 
itself determines whether the suspension of concessions in the 
same sector is impracticable or ineffective, and whether the 
circumstances are indeed serious enough.109 Placing such a 
determination in the hands of the complaining party affords 
wide latitude for abuse. The complaining party has the 
discretion to opt for retaliation in another sector, when in its 
own judgment, the suspension of obligations in the same sector, 
which could be availed of when the recommendations or rulings 
are not implemented within a reasonable amount of time,no is 
not effective. 
The DSU provides for additional safeguards to counter the 
potential severity of cross-retaliation. Before pushing forward, 
the party should request authorization from the DSB for the 
suspension of concessions.11l As a general rule, the DSB grants 
authorization to suspend the concession or obligation within 
thirty days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time, 
unless it decides, by negative consensus, to reject the request. 
108. DSU, supra note 81, art. 22:3. 
109. [d., art. 22:3 (b) & (c). 
110. [d., art. 22:1. 
111. [d., art. 22:2. 
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If the affected member objects to the level of suspension 
proposed, there is a final recourse in the form of arbitration, 
which may either be carried out by the original panel if 
available, or by an arbitrator appointed by the Director-
General. 112 
However, the scope of the arbitrator's authority is fairly 
circumscribed. The arbitrator cannot examine the nature of 
the concessions or other obligations to be suspended, but can 
merely determine whether the level of such suspension is 
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment of rights 
under the agreement. The arbitrator's evaluation is limited to 
the magnitude of the withdrawal of concessions, and not to the 
issue of cross-retaliation itself. As stated by one former GATT 
Senior Legal Officer, "[t]he objective is not to re-balance 
obligations, but [to] achieve compliance with the rules.,,1l3 As 
the rules allow retaliation across sectors, the chances of 
preventing the same are minimal, provided that there has been 
compliance with the procedural conditions. 
As a final resort, the DSU provides that if the matter referred 
for arbitration involves a claim regarding the rule that the 
complaining party first seek to suspend concessions in the 
same sector before opting to seek cross-retaliation, the 
arbitrator can determine whether or not such procedure has 
been followed. 114 This precautionary measure is equally 
constricted in its scope: It appears to confme itself to 
determining whether the proper sequence of options was 
complied with by the complaining party, rather than 
investigating an abuse of the discretion exercised by the 
complaining party. In the end, the complaining party retains 
the choice to retaliate in another sector, if it deems it 
impracticable or ineffective to do otherwise. 
Cross-retaliation is undeniably a potent tool. It is therefore is 
a vital component of the DSB's enforcement mandate. Cross-
112. [d., art. 22:6. 
113. Amelia Porges, The New Dispute Settlement: From the GATT to the WTO, 8 
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 115, 133 (1995). 
114. DSU, supra note 81, art. 22:7. 
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retaliation may be permitted, for instance, in the area of 
textiles or agriculture (which many developing countries 
export) for nullification of obligations in the field of financial 
services or intellectual property (where developed economies 
hold sway). While it forges "cohesion" in the WTO system,l15 it 
can also promote abuse in the hands of a powerful state, since 
the same "check and balance" design for ordinary retaliation 
applies to this extraordinary measure. Similarly, cross-
retaliation is ineffective if the weaker country that wishes to 
wield it, cannot use it against a stronger member. 
In order to ensure that the United States would accept the 
Uruguay Round agreements, then-USTR Mickey Kantor 
promised the Republican Congress that the Democratic 
administration would support legislation to establish a WTO 
Dispute Settlement Review Commission. This Commission 
would consist of five federal appellate judges, appointed by the 
President, who would review all fmal WTO dispute settlement 
reports adverse to the United States, to determine whether the 
panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the scope of the 
Agreement. Three out of five votes would be sufficient for an 
affirmative determination. 
Following the issuance of an affirmative determination by this 
Commission, any member of the U.S. Congress would be able to 
introduce a Joint Resolution calling on the President to 
negotiate new dispute settlement rules that would address and 
correct the problem identified by the Commission. 
Furthermore, if the Commission issues three affirmative 
determinations in any five-year period, any member of 
Congress could introduce a Joint Resolution to disapprove U.S. 
participation in the WTO. If such Resolution is enacted by 
Congress and signed by the President, the U.S. would 
commence withdrawal from the WTO Agreement.116 
115. Porges, supra note 113, at 124. 
116. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Documents Relating to the 
Agreement Between the Clinton Administration and Sen. Robert Dole Concerning the 
Uruguay Round Agreements, DAILY EXEC. REP. 225 (Nov. 25, 1994); Documents 
Relating to the Clinton Administration's Agreement with Sen. Robert Dole Concerning 
the Uruguay Round Agreement, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. 1865 (1994). 
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Largely because of these reassurances, the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act1l7 was signed into law on December 8, 1994. 
Both the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and the proposed 
Dispute Settlement Review Commission were designed to 
alleviate fears that these agreements would encroach on U.S. 
sovereignty. us The Uruguay Round Agreements Act decrees 
that any provision in the Uruguay Round agreements that is 
inconsistent with U.S. legislation that defines rights and 
obligations on a domestic level shall have no effect. U.S. laws 
cannot be changed by WTO decisions.u9 The Uruguay Round 
agreements, like the GATT, have no direct effect in the United 
States. 120 
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act clearly does not alter U.S. 
obligations at the international level. Yet the possible use of 
unilateral Section 301 sanctions - which fall within the scope 
of domestic U.S. law but are based on issues covered by the 
Uruguay Round agreements - would obviously violate the 
dispute settlement provisions of the WTO,l21 which provide the 
exclusive procedure for resolving trade disputes. The exclusion 
of all other modes of redress guarantees the transparency, 
predictability and security of the WTO process.122 In view of 
the unequivocal intent of the DSU, any argument that concedes 
117. 19 U.S.C. §3501 (1994). 
118. William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 427,457 (1995). 
119. Id. at 457,468. 
120. See Thomas William France, The Domestic Legal Status of the GATT: The 
Need for Clarification, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1481 (1994); Ronald Brand, The Status 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the United States Domestic Law, 26 
STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990); John Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 250,312 (1967). 
121. Section 301 has a broad scope. It was established by the U.S. Congress to 
protect the United States from "unfair trade practices." Section 301(a) authorizes 
retaliation against a foreign state if the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) determines 
that the rights of the U.S. under any trade agreement are denied or violated, or if an 
act of a foreign government is inconsistent with or denies benefits to the U.S. under 
such trade agreement, or if such action is unjustifiable and burdens U.S. commerce. 
Section 301(b) authorizes the USTR to take discretionary action if a foreign 
government practice is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. 
Commerce. Retaliation, which is subject to the specific direction of the President, can 
include the suspension or withdrawal of benefits of trade agreements as well as duties 
or other import restrictions. Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §2420. 
122. Andreas Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the 
New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 486 (1994). 
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the need for a "constructive" or "benevolent" unilateralism 
must necessarily be discarded.123 Many, however, still endorse 
the contradictory view that unilateralism spurred the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and continues to enhance 
the multilateral process in the global trade regime.124 
It is clear to the U.S. legislature that the WTO will not have the 
fmal decision on the rules, and that when the rules do not lead 
to a favorable outcome, the United States will negotiate for a 
change in the rules. Thus, even when the rationale of the 
enlarged WTO procedures is to ensure that all members 
conform with the rules, when such rules do not satisfy 
American interests (as represented by the Congress), the U.S. 
will work for their modification. The bottom line is that the 
United States, under present legislation, may take any 
unilateral action it deems appropriate, regardless of its 
obligations under the provisions of the Uruguay Round 
agreements. As one commentator put it, the U.S. "maintains 
sovereign authority to determine and regulate its behavior at 
both the domestic and internationallevels."125 While the DSU 
may sap the United States' resolve in utilizing its 301 
sanctions, or put differently, raise the bar for its use, the 
availability of the option remains. 
As long as one of the four major players in the world economy 
can wield the stick in total disregard of the dispute settlement 
process, the fragile balance of the adjudication process is 
always in jeopardy. The DSU establishes an effective sanction 
system on a multilateral level. As long as no unilateral action 
by any party is taken, no DSUIWTO rule is violated. However, 
the sword of Damocles that hangs over the head of the DSB 
123. See, e.g., Alan Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International 
Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'y. INT'L Bus. 263 
(1991); Alan Sykes, Mandatory Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some 
Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301 (1990); James R. 
Arnold, The Oilseeds Dispute and the Validity of Unilateralism in a Multilateral 
Context, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 187 (1994); Robert Hudec, Thinking About the New 
Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSNE UNlLATERALISM (Jagdish Bhagwati 
& Hugh Patrick eds., 1990). 
124. See Judith Hippler Bello, Claire E. Reade, Janet A. Nuzum & G. Hamilton 
Loeb, International Trade Highlights in 1995, 30 INT'L LAw. 391 (1996). 
125. Aceves, supra note 118, at 469. 
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cheapens the process, and bears a constant reminder of its 
mortality in the face of a powerful nation. In a sense, this piece 
of U.S. legislative sorcery in regard to dispute settlement is a 
microcosm of the entire evolution of GATT behavior 
modification to suit the interests of the major players in 
international trade. 
VIII. THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT OF THE DSU 
Although the new dispute settlement procedure in the WTO 
Agreement "judicializes" the entire process of conflict 
resolution, and pursues a fair equilibrium of rights among 
member states, the situational context of the new rules should 
be examined for a balanced perspective. The shift in 1994 from 
the GATT 1947 Agreement to the WTO represents a quantum 
leap in terms of the scope of coverage. What was once an 
agreement more or less restricted to trade in goods, has now 
expanded to one which eliminates barriers in the growing trade 
in services, intellectual property and investments, where the 
richer countries have an undeniably overwhelming intrinsic 
advantage over the less affiuent participating countries. As the 
developed nations' economies shifted from manufacturing 
towards their comparative advantage in services, GATT's 
gravitational center steadily migrated towards greater 
emphasis on trade in services, wider coverage in the realm of 
intellectual property, and to a lesser extent, concern with 
trade-related investment measures. 
To a large extent, the trade issues involved with services and 
intellectual property are intimately linked to the goods 
exported by the developed nations. The growth in services, 
mainly in the business service sector, is often necessary to 
obtain productivity gains in goods-producing industries. The 
bulk of international trade in services occurs in the form of 
services embodied in goods, for example, computer 
programming stored in a diskette as software or ISDN digital 
technology in telecommunications equipment. These services 
are built' into goods that are primarily subject to the usual 
tariffs and trade barriers for goods. Thus, in many cases, the 
export of higher-technology services are no different from the 
53
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export of goods arising from such services.126 Since the 
developed economies were victim to trade deficits with Japan 
and the NICs due to the disparity in their export volumes in 
manufactures, payment of these goods would no longer have 
been possible unless income from service, or embodied service 
exports could be generated. It was, therefore, inevitable that 
services and intellectual property would become an important 
concern in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
From this standpoint alone, changes in the relative competitive 
positions of the triangular relationship among LDC, NIC and 
the major economic powers, determined the peculiar balance -
or to be more precise the imbalance - of rights and obligations 
in the Uruguay Round agreements. This not too subtle policy 
drift was not surprising, considering that among the developed 
country markets, the Quad countries - the European Union, 
the United States, Canada and Japan - account for more than 
ninety percent of developed country exports. 
In contrast, the developing countries' share in world 
merchandise (excluding fuels) showed an increase from 14.4 to 
19.2 percent between 1980 and 1992, while their percentage of 
the world's export of services declined from 20.8 to 18 percent 
between 1985 and 1992. The developing countries' increasing 
share of world merchandise was mainly due to a doubling of 
their world manufactures' trade. The most important sectors 
(in terms of substantial market shares in the imports of 
developed market economy countries) are textiles and clothing, 
office machines and telecommunications equipment, electric 
machinery, furniture and footwear.127 From the point of view of 
total exports from developing countries, inclusive of Latin 
America, the growth in the share of manufactured goods was 
more than evident: a doubling from the 26% in 1965 to 53% in 
1990. Sub-Saharan Mrican countries and oil-exporting 
126. Herbert G. Grubel, Issues in Free Trade in Services Between Canada and the 
United States, in ECONOMIC AsPECTS OF REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS 109-124 
(David Greenway, Thomas Hyclak, Robert J. Thornton eds., 1989). 
127. UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 60, at 71-72. 
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developing states continue, however, to export primary 
products. 128 
Roughly 75% of these manufactured exports from developing 
countries to developed market-economy countries originated in 
developing East Asia.129 Fully 53% of developing countries' 
total non-fuel exports fmd their way into the three major 
developed country markets, namely the United States, Japan 
and the European Union. This suggests that the export of 
manufactures plays a more prominent role in the interests of 
developing countries in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, 
although traditional primary agricultural products and 
commodities still constitute a vital component of their 
international trade.130 
A "domino effect" played itself out as the Uruguay Round 
negotiations wore on. One by one, restrictions to trade in areas 
in which the less prosperous economies could not successfully 
compete, or even react satisfactorily, were gradually reduced. 
The new WTO agreements consummate an 
"institutionalization" of the lopsided balance of economic 
relationships between the "haves" and ''have-nots'', with the 
NICs occupying a legal Purgatorio, as they have often been 
accused as "free riders" in the erstwhile GATT system. 
Increased globalization of the marketplace under the WTO 
actually forces an economic survival of the fittest, a "winner-
take-all" global marketplace, which may not necessarily be 
beneficial to individual economies or their populace, or in the 
near term, erect the social safety nets to save those 
marginalized by market forces. The balance of concessions in 
the Uruguay Round erects a sublime facade of statutory 
harmony. The WTO order perpetuates a standardizing, 
homogenizing process, in which transnational corporations, 
who profit from standardization and cost efficiencies, and last 
128. I.M.D. LITILE, RICHARD N. COOPER, W. MAx CORDEN & SARATH 
R.AJAPATIRANA, BOOM, CRISIS AND ADJUSTMENT: THE MACROECONOMIC EXPERIENCE OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13 (1993). 
129. UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 60, at 63-64, 115. 
130. UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 60, at 65. 
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but not least, liberalized trade in goods and services, can thrive 
and dominate.131 
If there is any doubt as to the non-altruistic tenor of the 
negotiating positions of the developed countries, one need not 
look beyond the chronology of events in the Uruguay Round. In 
a more or less "official" history of the GATT negotiations, a 
former senior official of the GATT Secretariat explains why 
trade in services, at some point in the negotiations, became a 
focal point of discussion: 
A huge attraction for the developed countries was that 
international trade in services consisted largely of the activities 
at which they were best, and which drew on some of their 
greatest assets: banking and insurance, management know-
how, shipping and air transport, advanced communications and 
other technology. They argued that they could not accept open 
competition in their markets for products such as textiles and 
clothing, for which developing countries had important 
competitive advantages over them, unless they were allowed to 
exercise in world markets their competitive advantage for 
services. They also insisted that trade in goods was to an 
increasing extent linked with the supply of services, so that 
rules and disciplines for services were needed to ensure the 
strength of the international trading system as a whole. 
Developing countries generally felt themselves to be at a 
disadvantage in the area of services, except, possibly, as 
suppliers of manpower. To a great extent, they accepted 
inclusion of trade in services in the Uruguay Round only 
because this was a price they had to pay for negotiations on 
other matters of importance to them, and because they preferred 
multilaterally agreed rules to the almost certain alternative 
prospect of unilateral action by major countries to force open 
their markets.132 
131. Helena Norberg-Hodge, Break Up the Monoculture, THE NATION, July 15122, 
1996, at 20-23. 
132. JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 119-120 (World 
Trade Organization 1995) (emphasis added). 
56
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol5/iss1/6
1999] VIRTUAL REALITY AND REALITY 137 
Similar reasons accounted for the inclusion of intellectual 
property protection into the GATT deliberations: 
As in the case of services, developed countries 
saw their strength in the development of 
technology as a central competitive advantage 
on which they would need to be able to rely in 
the future, not least if they were being 
challenged by developing countries in areas of 
trade where they were at a competitive 
disadvantage. All participants in the round 
soon became aware that an agreement on 
TRIPS ("trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights") was, whether they liked it or 
not, an essential element for any final 
package. 133 
This double standard is prominent in the orientation of the 
Uruguay Round agreements. Great strides in the realm of 
intellectual property and broad sweeping provisions governing 
trade in services dwarf the minor revisions in the provisions of 
contingency protection (notably the small modifications to the 
anti-dumping provisions). 
The structural imbalance is not immediately evident; on the 
contrary, it is meant to remain unobtrusive, so long as there is 
a semblance of fairness and reasonableness in the rules of 
dispute settlement. But when the rules of the "club" are 
periodically changed to accommodate the shifting topography of 
the world economy, the new assortment of stipulations will 
tend to favor one class of countries or entities over another. 
Thus, while there is predictability in the enforcement of the 
rules within the system, the equity inherent in their 
application is questionable. To illustrate this point, this article 
discusses some of the salient features of the new intellectual 
property rights and services regimes below. 
133. [d. at 119·120 (emphasis added). 
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IX. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Two concerns spurred the United States and the European 
Union to attach great importance to intellectual property rights 
in their shopping list of concessions. First, many developing 
countries - the East Asian NICs conspicuously among them -
afforded shorter periods of patent protection, allowing domestic 
imitations of Western patents to flourish in their domestic 
markets. Moreover, enforcement of patent protection in these 
countries was severely deficient and vulnerable to 
administrative corruption. Second, most developing countries 
have tolerated the widespread production and sale of pirated 
video and sound reproductions, unauthorized copying of 
computer software, and the appropriation of trademarks (or 
brand names) in cheap imitations that somehow reduce the 
enhanced value of the original products. The American and 
European business interests that financed and developed the 
innovations in these products have lost billions of dollars. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS)l34 is the most ambitious, 
comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property 
ever, incorporating intellectual property right protection as an 
integral part of the international trading system embodied in 
the WTO. For the first time, the international community has 
accepted an agreement covering the broad subject matter of 
intellectual property law. TRIPS encompasses the main 
categories of intellectual property rights - including 
copyrights, trademarks, patents, geographical indications, 
industrial designs, and trade secrets - and lays down 
extensive rules for protection and enforcement. The TRIPS 
Agreement also embraces the DSU for resolution of disputes 
between WTO members involving substantive rights and 
domestic enforcement. All WTO member states, as a condition 
for membership, are compelled to abide by TRIPS, as well as 
134. WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 81, Annex Ie. 
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the other agreements concerning trade in goods, and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).135 
As in the case of pre-existing intellectual property 
conventions/36 the TRIPS agreement is not meant to 
harmonize all domestic intellectual property laws. Rather, 
TRIPS is meant to set minimum standards of protection that 
must be followed by the WTO members, which are allowed to 
implement these standards in a manner appropriate to their 
own legal systems, and even to provide higher levels of 
protection than those required.137 The obligations accord 
protection to "persons" of other members, which includes 
persons, natural or legal, who have close attachment to other 
members without necessarily being nationalsp8 
The standards set by the TRIPS Agreement largely correspond 
to the levels of protection set by major industrial countries. 
The main elements of protection are defined, the rights to be 
conferred and permissible exceptions are specified, and the 
minimum periods of protection are established. In theory at 
least, compliance with TRIPS is distinct from conformity with 
the pre-existing intellectual property conventions. In practice, 
however, the TRIPS Agreement requires, as an initial 
condition, that WTO members comply with all substantive 
obligations set down by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) conventions, the Paris and Berne 
Conventions in their most recent versions (but not the moral 
rights sections of the Berne Convention). All these substantive 
obligations are incorporated by reference into TRIPS. In 
addition, the TRIPS Agreement includes additional obligations 
135. WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 81, Annex 1A (Multilateral Agreements on 
Trade in Goods), and Annex 1B (General Agreement on Trade in Services). 
136. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last 
revised July 14, 1967,21 D.S.T. 1583, 828 D.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Words, Sept. 9, 1886, last 
revised July 24, 1971,828 D.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; International 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations, October 26, 1961, 496 D.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome 
Convention]; Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, opened 
for signature, May 26,1989,28 LL.M. 1477 [hereinafter IPIC Treaty]. 
137. TRIPS, supra note 81, art. 1(1). 
138. TRIPS, supra note 81, art. 1(3). 
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with respect to matters not covered by the prevIOUS 
conventions. 139 
The TRIPS Agreement makes transitional arrangements 
available to developing countries, in accordance with their level 
of development. Developing countries are given a grace period 
of five years to implement their obligations; the least 
developing countries are granted a transitional phase of up to 
eleven years.140 National treatment and most-favored nation 
obligations, however, are mandatory from January 1, 1996.141 
Despite the transitional periods, Article 65(5) prohibits 
countries from using the transition periods to reduce levels of 
protection inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Article 67 
thereof provides that developed member states shall provide, 
upon request and mutually agreed terms and conditions, 
technical and financial cooperation in favor of developing and 
least developing countries. 
Furthermore, since TRIPS merely provides minimum 
standards, it does not give any member state an excuse for 
withdrawing from its international obligations under another 
intellectual property convention. Some belieVE;) that the TRIPS 
Agreement already had de facto effect as an international 
norm, even before its formal de jure recognition in Marrakesh 
in April 1994. Hence, some argue that TRIPS' has a de facto 
effect even before the end of the transitional phase accorded to 
the developing states, when they technically accept de jure 
responsibility for their obligations.142 
Arguably,recognition of intellectual property rights continues 
to be the ideal. But from a trade theory perspective, a single, 
worldwide intellectual property protection standard may be 
neither pragmatic nor rational. Patent protection is a form of 
monopoly rent to the innovator that may create a monopoly of 
knowledge, by excluding smaller competitors from the market 
139. TRIPS, supra note 81, arts. 2(1) & 9(1). For an overview of the salient points 
of the TRIPS Agreement, see Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: 
The Emerging World View, 29 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 396-397 (1996). 
140. TRIPS, supra note 81, arts. 65, 66 & 69. 
141. TRIPS, supra note 81, art. 65. 
142. Otten & Wager, supra note 139, at 407-409. 
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who may be able to imitate and enhance the product to 
increase its intrinsic or social value. For developing countries 
without a fIrm industrial base, the TRIPS Agreement may 
insure an import monopoly for the patented products, and 
there would be little incentive for such countries to compete 
with the imported technology.143 
Trebilcock and Howse rightly assert that "[t]he level of 
intellectual property protection each country decides to afford 
will thus be rationally related to whether its comparative 
advantage resides more in innovation or imitation and 
adaptation of innovations made elsewhere, and the relative 
weight it gives to the interests of consumers (including its own 
producers who are consumers of inputs), imitators, and 
innovators."l44 The conventional view is that many countries 
agreed to higher intellectual property standards in order to 
gain, or maintain, continued access to the developed country 
markets that afford stricter protection to intellectual 
property. 145 Indeed, this conventional assertion may be the 
only realistic viewpoint.146 
The high performing economies among the developing 
countries possess the industrial capacity to replicate the 
foreign technology, and could compete effectively with the 
143. Samuel A. Oddi, TRIPS -- Natural Rights and a Polite Form of Economic 
Imperialism, 29 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 460 (1996). 
144. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RoBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 248-250 (1995). 
145. Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 1, 166-167 (1994). 
146. Edmund Kitch contends that developing countries should be motivated to join 
the world intellectual property system based largely on the American model simply 
because it is in their self-interest to do so. He writes: "If patent protection is weak or 
non-existent, industries will develop that rely for their existence on their ability to 
ignore the international patent system. Once these industries have developed, they 
have an interest in resisting any change in the rules. Although it may be in the 
overall, long run interest of the country to participate in both form and substance in 
the international patent system, the adversely affected industries will have incentives 
to expend their political capital to keep that from happening." Kitch, supra note 145, 
at 178. While this argument appears to be logical, experience has shown that once the 
East Asian NIC industries have determined that it is in their interest to participate in 
the intellectual property system for their own trade advantage, then they do so. The 
main point advanced here is that need and interest dictate, and will continue to dictate, 
the decision to conform to the imposed intellectual property standard, and not because 
of any perceived intrinsic value in conforming to it. 
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creators of the technology.147 If forced to comply with TRIPS, 
the NICs would suffer losses in the immediate term, since 
enforcement of intellectual property laws would retard copying 
the technology. However, a strong technological base would 
enable them to produce their own adapted technology. Thus, in 
the long run, the worldwide patent system, may be beneficial to 
the NICs.148 
Nevertheless, it is the height of naivete to assume that the less 
developed WTO members, with hardly the technological 
capacity to innovate or even to replicate inventions, and with a 
limited market, can benefit from increased protection. With no 
industrial infrastructure or efficient administrative system, 
patent protection of first world technology would provide no 
long-term advantage to less developed countries. Unless 
TRIPS concretely aids the industrialization efforts of the 
developing countries and confers upon their consumers 
sufficient disposable income to purchase such inventions, the 
economic benefits of TRIPS will accrue mainly to the developed 
countries149 and to those industrializing countries where 
intellectual property protection has gained a comparative 
advantage. Evidently, this is not the overriding objective of the 
. TRIPS Agreement, which is to increase economic welfare 
through freer trade; if it were, imposing foreign legal standards 
on unwilling states in the name of harmonization would be a 
sophisticated form ofneo-imperialism.150 
A strict enforcement of the TRIPS agreement would, in an age 
of rapid technological innovation, reduce the number of options 
available to a country to respond to the influx of imported 
patented or copyrighted technology. Trade-off's between 
147. Oddi, supra note 143, at 458. 
148. [d. at 459. 
149. [d. 
150. This turn of phrase is derived from a statement of Steven P. Ladas in 1975, 
and was popularized in much of the intellectual property law literature by the scholar 
Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and 
risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 813 (1989). According to 
Reichman, "[i]mposition of foreign legal standards on unwilling states in the name of 
'harmonization' remains today what Ladas deemed it in 1975, namely, a polite form of 
economic imperialism," citing STEVEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED 
RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 14-15 (1975). 
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innovation and imitation differ from country to country, 
depending on whether innovation is a major source of economic 
growth. 151 From this economic viewpoint, it is neither 
unreasonable nor unethical for many developing countries to 
have preferred a less stringent intellectual property regime. 
Since some of these countries often lack the assets to create 
their own intellectual property, obliging them to provide 
intellectual property protection for foreign entities is 
tantamount to requiring them to favor foreign over domestic 
interests. Furthermore, most intellectual property laws in 
these environments are instituted to protect domestic 
intellectual property holders, and not for the benefit of foreign 
intellectual property. 152 
In East Asia, as well as in other parts of the world, the nations 
that are least developed economically are those that favor the a 
low level of intellectual property, while the more economically 
developed ones adhere to a regime somewhat approaching the 
Western standards.153 All indications suggest that it is the 
level of economic development, and not any definitive economic 
policy or strategy that determines the degree of devotion to 
intellectual property protection. It is a fact that East Asian 
nations such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
China, flourished economically because of their supposedly 
"unauthorized" use of copyrighted foreign technology.1M 
The other factor to consider in this context is that the concept 
of intellectual property rights is a European construct, which 
may not be germane to a particular socio-cultural environment. 
In East Asia, Chinese Confucianism continues to exert a strong 
151. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 144, at 251. 
152. Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations 
and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 92 (1994). 
153. William P. Alford, How Theory Does -- and Does Not .. Matter: American 
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 15 
(1994). 
154. Id. at 16. Duane W. Layton, Japan and the Introduction of Foreign 
Technology: A Blueprint for Less Developed Countries?, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 171 (1982); 
Sang-Hyun Song & Seong-Ki Kim, The Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on 
Intellectual Property Laws in Knrea, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 118 (1994); Chung-Sen 
Yang & Judy Y.C. Chang, Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Law in the 
Republic of China, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 70 (1994). 
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influence in the legal culture. The countries at the forefront of 
the East Asian economic miracle have all been profoundly 
influenced by Confucian values, which have either consciously 
or unconsciously aided in their economic development.155 
Confucianism's model of a good society is one based on mutual 
consideration of the needs of others.156 Ideas or creations are 
not owned by their progenitors but are to be deemed part of the 
public domain. In most of the East Asian NICs influenced by· 
the Confucian ethic, the interaction of individuals and society 
is valued as much as an individual's rights. This is reflected to 
varying degrees in the formulation of their intellectual 
property laws. 
Adherence to higher standards of intellectual property 
protection came about within these countries, not through 
belated enlightenment to the virtues of such protection, but 
simply as a pragmatic response to a changing business 
environment. When it became competitively viable or 
politically necessary to embrace stricter levels of intellectual 
property protection, laws were revised or overhauled to adjust 
to the realities of the international marketplace. However, 
attitudes toward such protection did not necessarily change, 
nor did they have to change. Hence, enforcement of strict 
intellectual property laws remains a different issue - and 
problem, - altogether. Moreover, these legislative conversions 
occurred after a period of time during which intellectual 
property was not protected in the Western, non-Confucian 
sense, which allowed such countries to innovate from Western 
technologies and improve the pace of their economic 
development. 
In most cases, the development of intellectual property law 
accelerates when the country's economy requires it, either 
because it is necessary to guarantee access to an important 
export market, or when its level of technological prowess 
necessitates higher protection of intellectual resources. Before 
this "comfort level" is reached, imposing higher levels of 
155. Umehara Takeshi, The Civilization of the Forest, 7 NEW PERSPECTIVES 
QUARTERLY 3, 29-30 (1990). . 
156. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHlNA 8-60 (1990). 
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protection may, in fact, impede economic development. At 
worst, it can reinforce a developing country's lower state of 
economic development uls-a-uis richer developed and 
developing countries. Some examples follow to illustrate this 
thesis. 
Under the Japanese patent system, which constitutes a 
keystone to her industrial success, the Japanese took 
advantage of the exploitation-of-invention scheme, and paid 
little attention to the protection-of-invention guaranteed by the 
U.S. patent system. The Japanese patent system presumes 
that inventions can be made by industries and corporations, 
and not only by individuals. The objective of exploiting 
inventions is "the free dissemination of information and the 
guarantee of competitors' rights to "invent around" published 
inventions and exploit technology in the public domain."157 
Technology is something to be shared and distributed; the goal 
of development is not the fortune of any particular inventor, 
but constant innovation, which goal is best served by making 
technological information available to all.158 
In South Korea, conventional attitudes toward such rights have 
not changed greatly, even though intellectual property laws 
have been strengthened due to outside pressure to conform to 
some standardized system. Without a perception of and 
conviction regarding the importance of intellectual property 
rights, enforcement can be difficult.159 South Korea was 
induced to upgrade intellectual property protection when 
foreign investors turned to the second-tier NICs in Southeast 
Asia for more lucrative opportunities. At that point, South 
Korea needed higher technology industries to sustain its 
economic growth. 160 Patent protection encouraged the 
pharmaceutical industry to engage in more research and 
development, enacted legislation for compulsory licensing of 
157. Toshiko Takenaka, The Role of the Japanese Patent System in Japanese 
Industry, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 25, 29 (1994). 
158. Dan Rosen & Chikako Usui, The Social Structure of Japanese Intellectual 
Property Law, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 50-51 (1994). 
159. For an exposition of South Korean intellectual property protection, see Song & 
Kim, supra note 154, at 118, 120-121 (1994). 
160. Id. at 119, 138. 
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registered semiconductor chip layout-design, and spurred the 
growth of the publishing and software industries.161 
Taiwan is not a signatory to any international convention, 
including the GATT, WTO and the international property 
conventions. But in the past years, Taiwan has taken steps to 
speed up the pace of protecting intellectual property rightS.162 
Often, it has to rely on bilateral negotiations to resolve its 
trade disputes in the international community. Taiwan is 
especially sensitive to U.S. pressure, because of its large trade 
surplus with the U.S. and the threat of retaliatory measures 
under the Special 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade Act.l63 
x. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN 
SERVICES (GATS) 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) breaks 
new ground, since it represents the first extension of the global 
multilateral trade regime to cover the liberalization of trade 
and investment in services. On average, services now account 
for nearly three-fourths of the production and employment in 
industrialized countries. Although the role of services in the 
global economy is increasing, the service sector is protected in 
both developed and developing countries, usually through 
domestic regulatory regimes. Because services are not tangible 
like goods, they are not affected by tariff barriers, and thus 
require another trade framework for their international 
regulation. With the incorporation of GATS into the world 
trade order, the WTO advances the philosophy that the 
institutional control of services is necessary to remove 
impediments to the free flow of services and thereby accelerate 
global economic growth. The GATS attempts to lay 
161. Id. at 127-128, 134-137. 
162. For the latest developments in IPR in Taiwan, see Yang & Chang, supra note 
154. 
163. For an overview of Special 301 actions against Asian countries, see Liu, supra 
note 152, at 113-116. 
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international ground rules for governmental actions affecting 
transactions in services. l64 
The GATS is based a framework agreement that defines the 
obligations of the WTO members. It also includes: schedules of 
specific commitments made by each WTO member in regard to 
specific sectors, sub-sectors, or activities, which mayor may not 
be subject to particular qualifications; eight annexes that 
address sector-specific or horizontal matters; and Ministerial 
Decisions pertaining to the establishment of work programs for 
trade in professional services and terms of reference for future 
negotiations on maritime transport services.165 
164. It is not the intent of this section to explore the scope of the GATS in detail, 
but merely to point out its features in relation to the basic theses of this article. For a 
concise discussion on the GATS see Bernard Hoekman & Pierre Sauve, Liberalizing 
Trade in Services, 243 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS (World Bank 1994). Other 
authors on the GATS include: Aaditya Mattoo, National Treatment in the GATS: 
Corner-Stone or Pandora's Box, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 107 (1997); L. Altinger & A 
Enders, The Scope and Death of GATS Commitments, 19 WORLD ECONOMY 307 (1996); 
A. Ahnlid, Comparing GATT and GATS: Regime Creation under and after Hegemony, 3 
REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 650 (1994); P. Low, Impact of the Uruguay Round on Asia: Trade 
in Services and Trade Related Investment Measures, Paper Presented at the Asian 
Development Bank Conference on the Impact of the Uruguay Round on Asia, Manila, 
Philippines (1995). 
165.' The World Trade Organization Financial Services Agreement (FSA), 
completed on December 13, 1997, included market-opening commitments by 102 WTO 
members, which take effect in early 1999. Article 1 of GATS enumerates the following 
measures affecting trade in services: 
(a) cross-border: from the territory of one Member into the 
territory of any other Member; 
(b) consumption abroad: in the territory of one Member to the 
service consumer of any other Member; 
(c) commercial presence: by a service supplier of one Member, 
through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member; 
(d) presence of natural persons: by a service supplier of one 
Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the 
territory of any other Member. 
In summary, Article XVI of GATS stipulates that in measures where market-access 
commitments are undertaken, measures which a Member shall not maintain or adopt 
either on a regional or national basis, unless otherwise specified in its schedule of 
commitments, include limitations on: 
(a) the number of service suppliers; 
(b) the total value of service transactions or assets; 
(c) the total number of service operations or the total quantity of 
service outputs; 
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The GATS Agreement covers all possible modes of supplying 
services. Under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) rule in Article 
II of the GATS Agreement, WTO members commit to treat 
services provided by one member state in the same way as 
services from any other member. However, the same article 
allows members to maintain measures inconsistent with MFN 
treatment provided that the measure is listed and meets the 
conditions of the Annex on Article II Exceptions, the latter to 
be further negotiated in subsequent liberalizing rounds. Due 
to concerns of service providers in developed countries that an 
unconditional MFN "would allow countries with restrictive 
policies to maintain the status quo and Ofree ride' in the 
markets of more open countries," MFN derogations were left in 
the agreement, especially in the areas of telecominunications,t66 
financial services/67 maritime transport, audio-visual services 
and air transport. l68 The MFN derogations set forth in the 
Annex on Article II Exemptions, are generally not to exceed a 
period of ten years, and shall be subject to negotiation in 
subsequent trade liberalization rounds. 
While the spirit of the GATS Agreement aims to embrace 
practically all dimensions of the services sector, the obligations 
enumerated in the Agreement are triggered only if a member 
state schedules a particular commitment. Free trade in 
services exists only if the mode of supply in a specific sector is 
(d) the total number of natural persons that may be employed in 
a particular sector; 
(e) restricting and requiring specific types of legal entity or joint 
venture which a service supplier may supply; 
(0 foreign equity participation in terms of maximum percentage 
limit. 
166. No agreement on basic telecommunications could be reached when GATS and 
the WTO agreements were signed in Marrakesh in 1994. On February 15, 1997, sixty-
nine countries taking part in the Group on Basic Telecommunications - a negotiating 
group within the WTO - reached an agreement covering basic telecommunication 
services. The agreement takes the form of a Protocol to be attached to the GATS, and 
is officially designated as the Fourth Protocol of the GATS. For a detailed elaboration 
of the telecommunications agreement. See C.E.J. Bronckers & Pierre Larouche, 
Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 
L. 5 (1997). 
167. See Yi Wang, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment under the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services -- and its Application in Financial Services, 30 J. WORLD TRADE L. 
91 (1996). 
168. Pierre Sauve, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Half-Full 
or Half-Empty?, 29 J. WORLD TRADE L. 125, 130-131 (1995). 
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untrammeled by conditions in the member's schedule. 
Otherwise, the commitment is conditional. 
Moreover, the obligation to treat foreign service suppliers the 
same way as domestic foreign suppliers, which is the national 
treatment obligation in the GATTIWTO, is not an all pervasive 
rule under the GATS Agreement. While sectoral coverage is 
universal, the schedules may be qualified by limitations on the 
national treatment obligation. National treatment only applies 
selectively to sectors and activities, pursuant to the terms and 
conditions stated by each individual member country in its 
schedule of commitments. The GATS Agreement acknowledges 
that treatment of foreign and domestic suppliers may not 
always be identical, provided the competitive conditions facing 
foreign suppliers do not deteriorate. Uncertainty as to the 
precise meaning of the national treatment obligation, and the 
resulting differences in interpretation of the scope and extent 
of these obligations, may forestall the GATS' objective of 
creating a predictable trading environment for services.169 
Thus, while incorporation of the GATS into the GATTIWTO 
architecture does shift the center of gravity from trade in goods 
towards services, the core of GATS is more fluid than defmite, 
and depends largely on the relative relationships among 
member states, embodied in their schedules of commitment. 
The schedules of commitment involve a multilevel interplay of 
sectors, modes of supply and activities, and are qualified by a 
continuous negotiation for exemptions and limitations. Thus 
the GATS Agreement, in the long run, depends once again on 
the relative negotiating positions and comparative strengths of 
the parties vis-a-vis each other, as well as on their relationship 
to the whole corpus of GATS commitments. Further, if no 
schedules of commitment are made in any particular sector or 
sub-sector, then no liberalization of services takes place. The 
GATS does not require a change in the regulatory environment 
of the member states. If liberalization allows market access for 
outside suppliers, but is not matched by an antitrust policy to 
enhance competition, then the effect of openness in the service 
169. See the extensive discussion in Mattoo, supra note 164, at 198. 
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sector would not be felt.17O Developing countries will have to 
decide how quickly to integrate their economies with the rest of 
the world. However, as the Asian crisis demonstrates, such 
integration will hold dangers if the doors are suddenly swung 
open to foreign capital, without efficient financial 
infrastructures to control their flow. 
The making of the rules, therefore, relies on the makers of the 
rules. This is not to say that GATS is hopelessly flawed. As 
with any new major liberalization thrust, the process towards 
its ultimate objective is a gradual one. What is significant here 
is that the complex interplay of power interrelationships 
between member states intrudes on the theoretical "rule of 
law" balance advocated by the GATS. 
XI. THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The East Asian NICs will pay a heavy price as a consequence of 
the recent East Asian economic crisis, whether or not they are 
to blame.l7l In the context of the necessary devaluations of 
170. Bernard Hoekman, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade, in SERVICES IN 
WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS, No. 307, 327, 348-349 (Will Martin & L. Alan 
Winters eds., 1995). 
171. The East Asian financial shock began with Thailand's currency devaluation 
against the dollar in July of 1997. Prior to decline of the baht, foreign lenders poured 
money into Thailand because of its surging economy. Thais borrowed abroad because 
of lower rates, in U.S. dollars. Flush with foreign money, Thai financial institutions 
lent heavily. Some customers borrowed in dollars, not anticipating that the baht would 
lose value against the dollar. Others squandered their loans on non-productive 
investments. When foreign investors became worried about the Thais' ability to repay, 
they began moving their money out of Thailand and converted their money from baht 
to dollars. At first, the Thai central bank tried to prop up the baht by buying up baht 
with its dollar reserves and raising its interest rates to discourage baht sales. By July, 
the Thai central bank began to run out of dollars until it stopped defending its 
currency. 
The debacle in Thailand affected investors and borrowers in neighboring Southeast 
Asian nations who shared Thailand's problems of high foreign debt and questionable 
lending practices. People in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines started 
converting their currencies into dollars until the ringgit, rupiah and peso fell in value. 
The panic spread to Hong Kong, causing a fall in stock prices. Hong Kong, however, 
was able to keep its currency value against the dollar because the Chinese central 
bank, with its $88 billion in foreign reserves, was able to defend the Hong Kong dollar. 
Korea suffered next because, like the other countries, its development was fueled by 
heavy borrowing. In November 1997, the won collapsed. Later, the Japanese 
securities giant Yamaichi collapse, calling attention to Japan's wobbly financial 
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various East Asian currencies and the draconian measures 
required by the International Monetary Fund and the United 
States to restructure the economies, continued liberalization is 
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, these strategies will 
ensure that foreign investors will still be predisposed to 
consider increased investments in these East Asian economies. 
On the other hand, the East Asian countries affected will have 
to play another game of "catch up" once again, under global 
trading rules that will maintain the comparative advantage of 
the higher technology and more advanced economies. 
Currency devaluations will naturally make manufactured 
goods from East Asia even cheaper to the West, and leave 
profits depressed in the manufacturing industries. Until such 
time as exchange rate adjustments clear the huge glut of 
manufacturing capacity born out of the export-driven strategies 
of the East Asian NICs, the tradeable goods will eventually 
have to be unloaded on the less affected, developed country 
markets, pushing prices downward. As an Asian country's 
currency falls, the competitiveness of its products is enhanced, 
which puts pressure on the currencies of its competitors.172 
Trade friction will almost certainly ensue, because the 
deflationary trend would provoke larger trade deficits with the 
United States and Europe.173 The United States has already 
experienced this downturn in exports in its shipments of goods 
to the region, including Japan, China and Australia.174 This, in 
turn, might well provoke the use of contingency protectionist -
system, where banks are also affected by a mountain of bad debt. Asia's Financial 
Shock: How it Began and What Comes Next, WALL ST. J., November 26, 1997, at All. 
. 172. Martin Feldstein, Japan's Folly Drags Asia Down, WALL ST. J., November 25, 
1997, at A22. This article encapsulates Japan's role in the East Asian crisis, which 
more or less reflects the basic flaws of the Japanese model of development. It notes 
that "[ilt was therefore Japanese monetary and banking policies that encouraged and 
facilitated the large current account deficits of Southeast Asia and of South Korea. The 
low interest rates offered by the Japanese banks and their relatively lax credit 
standards made it possible for Asian borrowers to incur large amounts of foreign debt, 
much of it denominated in dollars. . The Japanese banks were eager to lend abroad 
because of the low interest rates and weak demand for credit at home. And they liked 
lending in dollars because of the higher interest rate receipts. When the yen fell 
relative to the dollar, however, many Asian borrowers found that they could no longer 
service their debts." [d. 
173. Global Growth at a Crossroads, Bus. WK., November 24,1997, at 190. 
174. Symptoms of the Asian Flu are Showing Up, Bus. WK., April 6, 1998, at 31. 
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particularly anti-dumping - measures still built into the WTO 
system, and worse, make the threat to use unilateral trade 
measures more palatable to policy-makers in the advanced 
economies.175 The Director General of the WTO specifically 
addressed these concerns in his remarks in April 1998 at the 
joint Asian Development BankIW orld Trade Organization 
seminar: 
A more real concern is what might be termed 
creeping protectionism - any unwarranted or 
excessive use of safeguards, antidumping 
actions or other discretionary policy tools to 
block out international competition. We in the 
WTO are watching the situation very carefully. 
To date there is no evidence of any protectionist 
measures being taken. But the trade effects of 
the crisis are only now beginning to be felt. 
Widening trade deficits could provoke 
protectionist sentiment; this must be resisted 
and we will continue to monitor developments 
. carefully.176 
What the Director General failed to mention, although 
immediately obvious, is that only the developed WTO member 
states have the political and economic wherewithal and the 
sophisticated legislative infrastructure to apply these 
"discretionary policy tools" to the goods of the affected 
developing country members. To reiterate, this is a lingering 
indication of the lopsided balance of interests inherent in the 
WTO system and the diminished capacity of the weaker states 
to influence the further revision of the rules that comprise the 
"rule-of-Iaw" architecture of the GATTIWTO system. 
The defeat of proposed "fast-track" legislation in the U.S. 
Congress demonstrates the erosion of support for free trade, at 
least within the legislative branch of the United States, and 
175. The Curse of Contagion, FIN. TIMES, Weekend November 22lNovember 23, 
1997, at 6. 
176. WTO Website, Director General's Opening Remarks, The Joint ADBIWTO 
Seminar, April 29, 1998 <http://www.wto.orglwto/new/adb_wto.htm>. 
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may presage the freer use of economic sanctions against target 
countries. 177 The U.S. Congress has already imposed trade 
sanctions against Burma. Other Southeast Asian countries 
may be potential targets, since their government policies or 
laws conflict with U.S. labor, environmental, human rights or 
religious standards.178 
In an expected display of Schadenfreude, some economists and 
pundits have been quick to point out that the crisis in Asia 
confirms the repudiation of the unique Asian model based on 
Japan's phenomenal success, which "combined the dynamism 
of the market with the advantages of centralized government 
planning.,,179 In plain language, "politicians picked industries 
to support; business leaders duly investment in them; and 
banks put up the money."l80 Ostensibly, the collapse of the 
East Asian bubble exhibits many of the features of over-
expansion, such as over-investment, non-productive 
investments, poor lending practices, overly rapidly credit 
growth, unsustainable economic policies, and even conspicuous 
consumption.1S1 Furthermore, the much heralded closeness or 
coziness of the government and industry which guaranteed 
astonishing economic growth, also led to exploitation by 
political leaders (corruption) and the relaxation of rules 
177. For an overview of fast-track legislation, see I.M. DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-
TRACK LEGISLATION (Institute for International Economics 1997). 
178. Paul Craig Roberts, A Growing Menace to Free Trade: U.s. Sanctions, Bus. 
WK., November 24,1997, at 28. 
179. Asian Economies: More Myth than Miracle?, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
November 25,1997, at 1. 
180. Stumbling Giants, TIME, November 24,1997, at 74. 
181. An editorial in the Financial Times succinctly encapsulates the crisis: 
Fast growth encouraged over-dependence on debt. It also raised 
the prices of land, inducing massive debt-financed investment in poor-
quality projects. Where exchange rates had been fixed, much of this 
borrowing was in foreign exchange. Such rickety financial structures 
can survive only as long as rapid growth and stable exchange rates 
also do. Once these underlying conditions disappear, lenders find 
their collateral impaired and the sale of assets by bankrupt borrowers 
further reduces its value. Bad debts grow, while foreign lenders flee. 
The weakening currency induces a rush into safe havens abroad. 
Once this happens, intrinsically sound borrowers can easily be pushed 
into bankruptcy. Investment halts and growth slows down even 
more, further aggravating the panic. 
A Threat to the World, FIN. TIMES, November 20,1997, atA13. 
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pertaining to lending and the disclosure of financial 
information.182 It should not be forgotten, however, that much 
of Asian business practice was, and is still based on personal 
contact and trust which have their roots in the traditional 
values of the ethnic Chinese which dominate much of the 
commerce of the region. l83 It can be said that what Asia 
suffered from was too much growth, and over-ambitious 
economic planning, in other words, that it had exceeded the 
optimum level of growth.l84 Banks had become not merely 
lenders, but investors in many failed enterprises. If Asian 
business practices have to be modified, then they should indeed 
be altered. But this does not constitute a blanket repudiation 
of traditional ways of doing business, rather, it points out their 
incongruity with the more complex and demanding 
requirements of transparency and risk analysis in the global 
economy. 
The prominent economist Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the 
Harvard Institute for International Development, claims that 
Asia's crisis was caused by the panicky outflow of international 
capital, rather than by any fundamental weakness. He has 
been quoted as stating, "[w]hat we have experienced is massive 
inflows based on high optimism about the region followed by 
massive outflows that one can only characterize as a panic .... 
While it is fashionable to talk about the crony capitalism in 
Asia and the myths of East Asian economic performance, I 
believe that - while those weaknesses are real- they cannot 
begin to account for the collapse.,,185 
Despite the flaws that have surfaced in this Japanese-inspired 
model of development - now criticized as only a good "catch-
up" model - it was the only viable model at the time that could 
enable the former primary producers of East Asia to break into 
the world economy and compete effectively. While the 
182. [d. at A13; East Asia Swallows its Pride, FIN. TIMES, November 24, 1997, at 
27. 
183. Culture Shock, FAR E. ECON. REV, April 16, 1998, at 54-55. 
184. What Asia May Need is Far Slower Growth, WALL ST. J., November 3, 1997, at 
1. 
185. Quoted in Nayan Chanda, Rebuilding Asia, FAR E. ECON. REV, February 12, 
1998, at 48. 
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emergence of another model may be necessary to lift the East 
Asian NICs out of the doldrums - for example one modeled on 
a paradigm of good governance, transparency and fiscal 
discipline - the decline of the East Asian juggernaut does not 
render its unique approach to development any less useful. 
What occurred was simply a degeneration of the Asian model of 
development due to the lack of checks and balances, which are 
a prerequisite to success in the global economy. 
In this period of East Asian decline, many have forgotten that 
many economists and other scholars from both East and West 
wrote volumes extolling the East Asian miracle, and that 
politicians and statesmen from other regions sought to emulate 
the East Asian example by initiating similar trade policies. In 
the few months prior to the East Asian collapse, the IMF and 
World Bank praised the East Asian economies, and cited their 
"sound fundamentals" - budget surpluses, balance of 
payments, high savings, low inflation and export-oriented 
industries. When the Asian bubble "burst" the IMF reverted to 
its "I-told-you-so" attitude and prescribed its usual mix of 
draconian cuts in social spending, devaluation of the currency, 
raising of interest rates, and opening the domestic economies to 
foreign ownership. The bottom line of many IMF prescriptions 
is to protect the interests of creditors, even to the detriment of 
the debtor nations.186 . 
The myth of the East Asian Miracle is as attributable to the 
foreign investors who saw large opportunities in Asia, as it is to 
the economic policies of the countries themselves. The East 
Asian Miracle would not have occurred, if the already 
developed countries and the multinational financial 
institutions had refused to fuel its growth. Between 1993 and 
1996, money managers from the United States, Europe and 
Japan pumped short-term foreign credit into Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia. By the end of 1996, according to an 
186. Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist of the World Bank, is an ardent critic of IMF 
austerity policies. He argues that the IMF bailout conditions in East Asia might cause 
a "severe recession" and were not necessary for macro-stability or long-term 
development. See Soren Ambrose, The IMF Has Gotten Too Big for Its Riches , THE 
WASHINGTON POST, April 26, 1998, at C2. 
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IMF estimate, European banks had lent $318 billion, and their 
Japanese and American counterparts $260 billion and $46 
billion respectively, to the East Asian countries. When the 
crisis broke in Asia, mutual fund investments in the region 
stood at $38.5 billion. Foreign banks frequently lent blindly, 
with little or no due diligence, due to the competitive pressures 
and the erstwhile attractiveness of the region.1S7 In other 
words, the fall of the East Asian tigers could be attributed not 
only to the bad governance on the part of the East Asian 
governments, but also to the pressures of financial 
globalization as well. 
For example, in the three years leading up to the cnS1S, 
Thailand had savings to support 6.7% growth, but with foreign 
loans and investment, could grow at 8.2% on average. 
Malaysia's potential growth rate was 7.5% for 1993 to 1996, but 
was fueled to 9% with foreign lending. Indonesia's real growth 
averaged about 7.8%, compared to its potential growth of 7.2%. 
Foreign investors pumped loans into Asia despite plunging 
returns. But a majority of those loans were short-term. Hence, 
the accumulation of maturing loans was the proximate cause of 
the crisis. 
The Asian crisis can also be viewed as a kind of a bank-run, in 
which international banks deserted their borrowers when 
international confidence in the Asian currencies declined. 
Developed markets were the primary export targets of these 
NICs, whose domestic markets were small and relatively 
unsophisticated, but the export-led strategy would have failed 
if the goods had not been priced competitively and thus were 
not welcomed by the importing nations. 
The APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) meeting held in 
Vancouver, Canada in 1997 merely reiterated APEC's avowed 
mission to liberalize trade among eighteen Pacific Rim nations, 
including the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea and China, 
and the troubled Southeast Asian economies such as Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines. At this meeting, the 
187. Rebuilding Asia, FAR E. ECON. REV, February 12, 1998, at 47. 
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leaders renewed their commitment to opening their markets to 
one another, instead of reacting to the crisis by becoming more 
protectionist. However, one cannot gloss over the fact that the 
definition of "liberalization" is elastic. While some countries 
wanted firm timetables for cutting tariffs, a number of Asian 
countries declared that liberalization need only involve 
"economic and technical cooperation" with other members, and 
that decisions on the reductions be made voluntarily, and not 
by all countries. In the long run, what matters are the detailed 
work programs to be hammered out during the six months 
after the summit. It is certain that the events in East Asia in 
the near term will affect the final scheme to be formulated. l88 
Thus, the general commitment to liberalization manifested 
during the forum may not be a sufficient guarantee. 
The APEC nations also gave their blessing to allow the 
International Monetary Fund to dictate the terms needed to 
rehabilitate the ailing economies.189 The bitter medicine the 
IMF intends to impose are measures to reduce wasteful 
subsidies, eliminate pork-barrel projects, close insolvent banks, 
and adopt other politically unpopular belt-tightening policies 
that seem anathema to the close relationships between the 
government and private sector in many East Asian 
economies.190 There are critics, however, who believe that the 
IMF prescriptions actually "punish the victim" and that the 
stringent measures (e.g., fiscal austerity and high interest 
rates) might transform a "temporary lapse in investor 
confidence into a full-blown global recession" and ultimately do 
more harm than goOd.191 
Paradoxically, China has been shielded from the Asian 
economic downturn because it is not a member of the World 
Trade Organization, and hence it is outside the international 
economic order. China could thus still protect its domestic 
188. Elastic Approach to Free Trade, FIN. TIMES, November 24,1997, at 3. 
189. Summit Stresses Trade, Leaving Bailouts to IMF, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
November 27, 1997, at B1l. 
190. Id. at B12. 
191. Critics Challenge IMF's Plan for Asia, WASH. POST, November 29, 1997, at C1-
C2. 
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manufacturers as it maintains its outward-looking export 
strategy. And since China's currency is not fully convertible, it 
is partly immune from the currency speculation that caused an 
outflow of investment from the Asian region.192 By contrast, 
the Asian region, as a whole, has already been devalued as an 
emerging stock market region, having been overtaken not only 
by Latin America but also by Eastern Europe.193 Unlike the 
Mexican currency crisis, the East Asian malaise reflects the 
inherent flaws of the "catch-up" system, and requires a drastic 
alteration of its development approach if it is to conform to the 
rules of global economy. It will be difficult for the economically 
afflicted countries in Asia to reform on their own, without an 
international, multilateral component that can help support 
the tough changes necessary to restructure the financial and 
developmental systems.194 
More concretely, the effects of the Asian currency turmoil will 
be noticed in the inability of the governments to make 
politically sensitive commitments in areas which have been 
increasingly linked to trade, such as the environmental and 
labor standards. For instance, global talks on liberalization of 
the financial services market are expected to receive weaker 
commitments from the affected Asian states.195 The WTO 
dispute settlement system, in light of this crisis, will become 
either more important or more a nuisance than ever. It will 
either serve as the last resort of Asian industrializing countries 
buffeted by the decline of the East Asian miracle economies, or 
will yield to a resurgence of negotiated settlements outside the 
WTO framework. The latter alternative may be more 
. prevalent in an economic crisis, when the constraints of the 
system are too restrictive. What is certain is that the East 
Asian problem will cause a dislocation of the notion of 
balancing interests that is distinctive to the WTO design. To 
192. China's Trade Barriers Provide Shelter in Asia's Storm, INT'L HERALD TRIB., 
November 26,1997, at 18. 
193. Asia's Emerging Markets Fall Back, FIN. TIMES, November 28, 1997, at 19. 
194. See Karl D. Jackson, Introduction: The Roots of the Crisis, in AsIAN 
CONTAGION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF A FINANCIAL CRISIS 1, 23 (Karl D. 
Jackson ed., 1999). 
195. Better Offers Expected at WTO Financial Services Talks, FIN. TIMES, 
November 11, 1997, at 6. 
78
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol5/iss1/6
1999] VIRTUAL REALITY AND REALITY 159 
date, the resolution of disputes appears to be moving forward 
at an accelerated pace, considering the large number of cases 
filed by non-traditional claimants. But the decided cases at 
both panel report and Appellate Body levels demonstrate that 
no fundamental test case involving a clash between the East 
Asian panoply of trade interests, on the one hand, and the 
sophisticated trade protection measures of the developed 
countries, on the other, has yet arisen. It remains to be seen 
whether countries in the WTO scheme will continue to 
subordinate their national interests, and the narrow group 
interests embraced therein, to the survival of the global trading 
order in its present asymmetric configuration. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this article is to illustrate in detail how 
the purportedly rule-based system of the GATTIWTO trading 
order is not, in reality, truly a system based on the rule oflaw. 
Rather, it is a formally rule-based system that co-exists with a 
trade regime that is still based on the relative economic and 
political power-based relationships among the member states. 
The entire proliferating corpus of rules and trade law 
"jurisprudence" has created a mainstream philosophy that 
advances the notion that the global trading order is, indeed, 
moving towards a rule of law scheme. When used in connection 
with the new linkages between trade and non-trade issues, rule 
of law is really a euphemism for further concessions by East 
Asian NICs to the American and European agendas in the new 
"millennium round" of global trade negotiations, slated for the 
year 2000. 
Given the troubled state of many Asian economies, further 
liberalization under the existing trade regime might actually 
worsen the economic turmoil and could, as the IMF 
prescriptions, add fuel to the fire still raging in the region's 
economies. 
Having to open various sectors of their economies to foreign 
competition could not come at a worse time for the recovering 
East Asian economies. The issues currently under discussion 
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are sensitive areas of immediate concern to the developing 
nations, including agriculture, services, intellectual property 
rights, labor and children's rights, subsidies, anti-bribery 
measures, trade and competition policy, and the environment. 
Even a cursory consideration of these matters would lead to 
another clash between severely weakened East Asian 
negotiators and the visibly strengthened hand of the main 
supporters of the existing trade order.196 The ongoing fire sale 
of the regional "crown jewels" - the regional keiretsus, 
chaebols or multinational industrial complexes - might even 
spark a backlash if foreign companies would tend to dominate 
the local industries.197 South Korea's long history of foreign 
invasion and colonialism has bred a deep-seated "us-versus-
them" mentality, which ,stands as a road block to foreigners 
trying to gain access to Korea's insulated economy, although 
this might be the only option available to save debt-ridden 
chaebols and banks on the verge of bankruptcy. The IMF's 
bailout program, which involves the extension of more than $57 
billion to ease a $187 billion overseas debt, requires Korea to 
fling open the doors not only of its conglomerates, but also of its 
domestic stock and bond markets.19B 
The only viable alternative to the "defensive" posture of the 
developing nations is the more "assertive" approach suggested 
by a trade expert of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), who proposes a more equitable 
exchange of concessions between the Pacific states and the 
United States and Europe. For example, the Cairns group of 
agricultural countries could demand better access to European 
Union markets and the elimination of market-distorting 
agricultural subsidies, in exchange for receptivity in the area of 
services and more vigorous implementation of intellectual 
property rights. East and South Asian countries could push for 
increased tariff liberalization in textiles, electronics and 
chemicals, to counteract concessions in trade/environment and 
pro-transparency, anti-corruption domestic policies which, after 
196. See Shada Islam, The Heat is On, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 21, 1998, at 6l. 
197. Few Takers So Far at Asia's Great Firesale, FARE. ECON. REV., March 5, 1998, 
at 52-54. 
198. Unlocking the Citadel, FAR E. ECON. REV., March 26, 1998, at 10-12. 
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all, cannot be effectively implemented by the enforcement 
mechanisms of an international body such as the WTO. Most 
important, a modus vivendi should be sought, once and for all, 
to reduce, if not eliminate the pernicious' effects of anti-
dumping legislation in the European Union, and to shift the 
focus of the debate towards negotiations on global competition 
rules. 199 
The WTO noted in the latest Annual Report by the Director-
General that, despite the Asian crisis, there have been no 
major trade policy reversals, and there is little evidence of 
market closings in the world, not even in those countries 
directly affected by the financial crisis. Not only are the 
multilateral commitments under the Uruguay Round generally 
respected, but a large majority of countries have recently 
signed the new Agreements on Trade in Financial Services and 
on Telecommunication Services, and have committed 
themselves to the Declaration on Trade in Information 
Technology Products (ITA). At the same time, however, the 
WTO's Annual Report admits that "[t]rade frictions between 
major trading partners seem also to be on the rise. While these 
tensions are localized and often confined to long-standing 
issues, they indicate growing sensitivity about market access 
as global economic activity weakens, regional cycles diverge 
and current account imbalances increase.,>200 It remains to be 
seen, however, whether the international trading system will 
hold out of a true willingness to adhere to the principles of 
liberalization, or if the participation of the less affluent 
countries continues to be regarded as a "necessary evil" to 
preclude exclusion from the system. The greatest danger to the 
system still lies in the economic and political might of the 
developing countries, which might or might not remain 
committed to upholding the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism when a panel decision runs contrary their national 
or policy interests. The clash between the U.S. and the EU 
199. Islam, supra note 196, at 61. 
200. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT, ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, 
4 WTIl'PRlOVl4 (Trade Policy Review Body, November 30, 1998). 
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over the European practice of granting preference to its former 
Mrican, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) colonies for imports of 
bananas will determine whether selective compliance - or 
conversely "enlightened unilateralism" within the system -
will be tolerated or not.201 
Finally, a caveat and disclaimer. The arguments made in this 
article are not meant to disparage the efforts of the WTO 
member countries to build a working trade order founded on 
the fundamental principles of free and fair trade. The WTO 
framework and its evolutionary dispute settlement mechanism 
are legal devices that would have been unthinkable in the 
postwar era when the GATT was established. Yet history 
cannot be written, or rewritten solely for the benefit of those 
who write and enjoy the rules. This article has sought to 
illustrate that there is a world of a difference between the 
"virtual reality" formulated by this global trade architecture, 
and the cold reality that nonetheless dictates the trade 
behavior of the countries that constitute the system in its 
actual, working form. 
201. Banana-trade Split, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 11, 1999, at 49. 
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